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et al.: Minnesota and the Fair Credit Reporting Act: A Proposed Reform of

MINNESOTA AND THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT: A
PROPOSED REFORM OF AN INADEQUATE LAW
John Smith felt assured of being promoted to vice-president by the
Major Industries Corporation. After ten years of hard work, he was
finally receiving recognition.
Because the vice-presidency was an importantposition, the company
followed its usual procedureof applying for an insurancepolicy on Mr.
Smith's life, naming the company as sole beneficiary.Also following its
standardprocedure, the insurancecompany, upon receipt of the application, requested information on Mr. Smith from a credit reporting
bureau. Unable to locate more than a few colorless statements in its
files about Mr. Smith, the credit reporting bureau began interviewing
Mr. Smith's neighbors. When the report was forwarded to the insurance
company, it contained a statement from undisclosed sources that Mr.
Smith was known to abuse alcohol. The reportfurther stated that these
anonymous sources had seen Mr. Smith's garbage cans piled high with
beer cans.
When the insurance company refused to issue a policy on Mr.
Smith's life, Major Industries Corporationrequested and received the
reason for this refusal. Mr. Smith was not promoted. Because he never
learned about the report, he did not have the opportunity to explain
that the piles of beer cans were from his son's collection. Periodically,
he ordered his twelve year old to cull out and discard the duplicates.
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I. INTRODUcTION
The story of Mr. Smith may appear to be a fantasy. Although the
specific facts are fictional, Mr. Smith's problem is real. As the credit
reporting industry grows, individual privacy diminishes. Today, credit
bureaus maintain approximately 120,000,000 files on consumers' and
respond daily to numerous requests for information. When an individual
applies for insurance, credit, or even employment, the information contained in a credit bureau's file on that individual often will be the basis
for granting or denying the benefit sought. What if that information is
false, misleading, or obsolete? To whom and for what purpose can an
individual's credit file be revealed?
In response to these concerns, Congress enacted the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) in 1970.2 The Act, through its elaborate system of
rules and procedures, is designed to protect the individual's right to
privacy and fair treatment 3 while at the same time permitting credit
bureaus to perform their necessary function.' By substituting special
remedies for traditional common law causes of action, 5 the FCRA has
had a substantial impact on consumers.' This Note attempts to analyze
the FCRA and its impact on the Minnesota consumer. After a brief
discussion of the deficiencies of common law regulation of credit report1. Proposed Amendments to the Fair Credit ReportingAct: Hearings on S. 2360 Before
the Subcomm. on Consumer Credit of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1973) (statement of John L. Spafford, President, Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings];cf. PRIVACY PROTECTION
STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 55-56 (1977) ("The five

largest [credit bureaus] . . . together maintain more than 150 million individual credit
records.").
2. See.Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, §§ 601-622, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1976)) (amended 1978).
3. See 116 CONG. REc. 35941 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire) ("The purposes of the
Fair Credit Reporting Act are to give consumers a chance to correct inaccurate information in their credit file; to preserve the confidentiality of such information; and to prevent
undue invasions of the individual's right to privacy.").
4. See id. at 36572 (remarks of Rep. Sullivan) ("The new title attempts to balance the
need by those who extend credit, insurance or employment to know the facts necessary to
make a sound decision, and the consumer's right to know of adverse information being
disseminated about him, and the right to correct any erroneous information so disseminated.").
5. Compare Fair Credit Reporting Act § 610(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (1976) (restricting
common law defamation, invasion of privacy, and negligence actions against consumer
reporting agencies) with id. §§ 616-617, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n-1681o (civil liability for failure
of user or consumer reporting agency to comply with any requirement imposed by the
Act).
6. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 1, at 672 (statement of Albert A. Foer); Note, The Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 23 ME. L. REv. 253, 257 (1971); Note, The Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 56 MINN. L. REv. 819, 841 (1972); cf. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra
note 1, at 57 ("[The Fair Credit Reporting Act... has had its own, independent impact
on the credit reporting industry.").
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FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT

ing abuses,7 this Note will examine the definitional problems of the
FCRA,8 and its regulatory provisions Following this is a discussion of
the limitations of the FCRA that have resulted from inconsistent interpretations of the Act,'0 with emphasis on how the FCRA has been interpreted in Minnesota." As a backdrop for a proposal of supplementary
legislation in Minnesota,' 2 this Note examines both the responses of
other state legislatures to the problem of credit reporting abuse' 3 and an
analogous response of the Minnesota Legislature to the need for individual privacy.' 4 Finally, this Note offers a proposed credit-reporting statute for Minnesota, which is designed to remedy some defects in the
FCRA, and offer better protection for the Minnesota consumer."
II.

REGULATION OF CREDIT REPORTING UNDER THE COMMON LAW

The history of the credit reporting industry is not unblemished. With
the industry maintaining approximately 120,000,000 dossiers, 6 a certain
amount of abuse occurs. 7 Although historically abuses of credit reporting have been regulated by the common law," the common law has not
always provided the injured consumer with an effective remedy." If a
7. See notes 18-37 infra and accompanying text. Credit reporting abuse is defined
functionally in terms of the types of activities that the Fair Credit Reporting Act
[hereinafter cited as FCRA] was designed to prevent. The reporting of false information
regarding a consumer is the most obvious type of abuse. Other examples include reporting
of obsolete information, reporting information for illegitimate purposes, and failing to
make required disclosures to consumers. Cf. 1973 Hearings, supra note 1, at 638 (statement of John H.F. Shattuck) (listing the injuries to which subjects of credit reports are
most commonly subjected). See generally A. NEIER, DOSSIER: THE SECRET FILES THEY KEEP
ON YOU 133-45 (1975); notes 97-100 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 43-73 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 74-103 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 104-69, 192-202 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 170-91 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 263-71 infra and accompanying text; Appendix.
13. See notes 203-42 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 243-62 infra and accompanying text.
15. See Appendix.
16. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
17. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 1, at 619 (statement of Arthur R. Miller); Note,
Panaceaor Placebo?Actions for Negligent Noncompliance Under the FederalFairCredit
Reporting Act, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1070, 1090 (1974) ("As many as one out of every 20
reports prepared may contain material errors."); Note, Protecting the Subjects of Credit
Reports, 80 YALE L.J. 1035, 1035 (1971).
18. See, e.g., Locke v. Bradstreet Co., 22 F. 771 (C.C.D. Minn. 1885); McDermott v.
Union Credit Co., 76 Minn. 84, 79 N.W. 673 (1899); Traynor v. Sielaff, 62 Minn. 420, 64
N.W. 915 (1895); Lowry v. Vedder, 40 Minn. 475, 42 N.W. 542 (1889). See generally W.
Possft, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs §§ 111-113, 115 (4th ed. 1971).
19. See, e.g., Locke v. Bradstreet Co., 22 F. 771 (C.C.D. Minn. 1885); 1973 Hearings,
supra note 1, at 667 (statement of Lewis A. Engman, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission); Note, The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 56 MINN. L. Rxv. 819, 821 (1972).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1979

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 2
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

JVol. 5

reporting agency disseminated false information, the consumer could
bring a libel action to recover damages." In some jurisdictions, common
law actions for negligence and invasion of privacy have afforded consumers relief from credit reporting abuses. 2 Although the Minnesota
court has not yet adopted the invasion of privacy tort, it explicitly left
open the possibility for recognizing this common law action.22
Minnesota has, however, recognized the tort of libel as a remedy for
the reporting of false credit or employment information.n In maintaining an action for libel under the common law, a plaintiff was required
to show the publication of a false statement in order to recover damages.2 ' Because the courts recognized the legitimate business interests
20. See, e.g., Wilson v. Retail Credit Co., 325 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. Miss. 1971), aff'd, 457
F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1972); Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 3 Cal. App. 3d 368, 83 Cal. Rptr.
540 (1970); Bartels v. Retail Credit Co., 185 Neb. 304, 175 N.W.2d 292 (1970); Thornton
v. New South Life Ins. Co., 262 S.C. 651, 207 S.E.2d 88 (1974) (per curiam). See also W.
PROSSER, supra note 18, § 111, at 745.
21. See, e.g., Serino v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 396 (D.S.C. 1967) (negligence); Shorter v. Retail Credit Co., 251 F. Supp. 329 (D.S.C. 1966) (invasion of privacy);
Yoder v. Smith, 253 Iowa 505, 112 N.W.2d 862 (1962) (invasion of privacy).
22. See Hendry v. Conner, 303 Minn. 317, 319, 226 N.W.2d 921, 923 (1975) (per curiam);
cf. Note, Tortious Invasion of Privacy: Minnesota as a Model, 4 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv.
163, 177 (1978) ("[The court in Hendry did not refute a common law right of privacy.").
Addressing the issue of whether to recognize invasion of privacy in Hendry v. Conner, the
Minnesota court stated:
Minnesota has never recognized, either by legislative or court action, a cause
of action for invasion of privacy . . . . It is not necessary for the disposition of
this case to decide whether a cause of action for invasion of privacy should be
recognized in Minnesota. It is sufficient to hold that, even if we were to do so,
the conduct of defendant . . . does not constitute a violation of plaintiff's privacy.
303 Minn. at 309, 226 N.W.2d at 923. See generally Note, supra; see also Morris v. Danna,
411 F. Supp. 1300, 1303-05 (D. Minn. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 547 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1977);
Hurley v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 967 (D. Minn. 1967), aff'd per
curiam, 398 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1968); Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp.
957 (D. Minn. 1948).
Similarly, Minnesota has not recognized an action in negligence for misstating credit
information. Apparently, the South Carolina Federal District Court is the only court that
has done so. See Serino v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 396, 398 (D.S.C. 1967)
("Extensive research by counsel and independent research by the court have failed to
disclose any case sufficiently close to the facts of this case as to constitute precedent that
there is, or is not such a cause of action.").
23. See, e.g., Northwestern Detective Agency, Inc. v. Winona Hotel Co., 147 Minn. 203,
179 N.W. 1001 (1920) (credit); Hoff v. Pure Oil Co., 147 Minn. 195, 179 N.W. 891 (1920)
(employment); Froslee v. Lund's State Bank, 131 Minn. 435,155 N.W. 619 (1915) (credit);
Hebner v. Great N. Ry.,- 78 Minn. 289, 80 N.W. 1128 (1899) (employment); McDermott
v. Union Credit Co., 76 Minn. 84, 79 N.W. 673 (1899) (credit); Trebby v. Transcript
Publishing Co., 74 Minn. 84, 76 N.W. 961 (1898) (credit); Traynor v. Sielaff, 62 Minn.
420, 64 N.W. 915 (1895) (credit); Zier v. Hofflin, 33 Minn. 66, 21 N.W. 862 (1885) (credit);
Woodling v. Knickerbocker, 31 Minn. 268, 17 N.W. 387 (1883) (credit).
24. See, e.g., Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 3 Cal. App. 3d 368, 372-73, 83 Cal. Rptr. 540,
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of many who depend on credit reports," judicial recognition of a qualified privilege to report credit information frequently made the recovery
of damages very difficult in such libel actions. 2 The privilege was conditioned on the agencies furnishing information in a good faith response
to honestly-made inquiries." Even if the credit bureau was negligent,
however, its qualified privilege covered the reporting of credit information or business information, 3 including an individual's past employment history.3 The privilege was justified on the theory that making
such information freely available outweighed the occasional harm that
resulted from reporting false information. 30
Ordinarily, proof of a defamatory statement would warrant recovery
by the consumer in a libel action."' Assertion of the quolified privilege,
however, insulated the credit bureau from liability32 unless the con542-43 (1970); cf. Hoff v. Pure Oil Co., 147 Minn. 195, 198, 179 N.W. 891, 892 (1920) ("It
is well settled that proof of the truth of an alleged libel is a complete defense . . ").
25. See, e.g., Wilson v. Retail Credit Co., 325 F. Supp. 460, 463 (S.D. Miss. 1971), aff'd,
457 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1972); W. PROSSER, supra note 18, § 115, at 789-91; Note, The Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 23 ME. L. Rav. 253, 254-55 (1971).
26. W. PROSSER, supra note 18, § 115, at 790; see, e.g., Locke v. Bradstreet Co., 22 F.
771, 772-73 (C.C.D. Minn. 1885); Hebner v. Great N. Ry., 78 Minn. 289, 291, 80 N.W.
1128, 1129 (1899); Traynor v. Sielaff, 62 Minn. 420, 424, 64 N.W. 915, 916 (1895). See
generally Note, MinnesotaDefamation Law and the Constitution:FirstAmendment Limitations on the Common Law Torts of Libel and Slander,3 WM. MrrcfsilL L. RzV. 81, 8789 (1977).
27. Two jurisdictions, Georgia and Idaho, have refused to extend the qualified privilege
to the reporting of credit information. See Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172 (1886);
Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 696, 704-05, 139 P. 1007, 1010 (1914).
28. See Locke v. Bradstreet Co., 22 F. 771, 773 (C.C.D. Minn. 1885); Hebner v. Great
N. Ry., 78 Minn. 289, 291, 80 N.W. 1128, 1129 (1899); W. PRossEa, supra note 18, § 115,
at 789-90; cf. Traynor v. Sielaff, 62 Minn. 420, 424, 64 N.W. 915, 916 (1895) (communication of defamatory statement from individual to credit bureau, not made in the discharge
of a public or private duty to do so, held not privileged); Lowry v. Vedder, 40 Minn. 475,
475, 42 N.W. 542, 543 (1889) (malicious defamatory communication by individual to credit
bureau not privileged).
29. See, e.g., Hoff v. Pure Oil Co., 147 Minn. 195, 199, 179 N.W. 891,892 (1920); Hebner
v. Great N. Ry., 78 Minn. 289, 291, 80 N.W. 1128, 1129 (1889); W. PRossER, supra note
18, § 115, at 789.
30. Note, supra note 25, at 254; see 1973 Hearings, supra note 1, at 667 (statement of
Lewis A. Engman, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission); W. PROSSER, supra note 18, §
114, at 776-77.
31. See Note, Consumer Protection: Regulation and Liability of the Credit Reporting
Industry, 47 NoTRE DAME LAw. 1291, 1297 (1972). See generally W. PRossER, supra note
18, § 113, at 766.
32. See, e.g., Locke v. Bradstreet Co., 22 F. 771, 773 (C.C.D. Minn. 1885); Hoff v. Pure
Oil Co., 147 Minn. 195, 199, 179 N.W. 891, 892 (1920); Froslee v. Lund's State Bank, 131
Minn. 435, 438, 155 N.W. 619, 620 (1915); Hebner v. Great N. Ry., 78 Minn. 289, 291, 80
N.W. 1128, 1129 (1899); cf. Lowry v. Vedder, 40 Minn. 475, 475, 42 N.W. 542, 543 (1889)
(qualified privilege not available to defendant who communicated false information with
malice).
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sumer could prove malice.u Because malice is seldom a reason for publishing the defamatory statement in reporting abuse cases, 34 and because even when present, malice is difficult to prove,35 the injured consumer often was left without an effective remedy. 36 Weakened by the
qualified privilege, libel actions offered little protection from credit reporting abuses. As a result, the credit reporting industry effectively went
unregulated. 7 Injured consumers were not compensated for the damages
they had suffered.

Im.

THE FAIR CREDIrr REPORTING AcT

When Congress recognized the failure of common law remedies to
protect the consumer from credit reporting abuses, it enacted the
FCRA 5 as part of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.39 The FCRA
33. See, e.g., Lowry v. Vedder, 40 Minn. 475, 475, 42 N.W. 542, 543 (1889); 1973 Hearings, supra note 1, at 667 (statement of Lewis A. Engman, Chairman, Federal Trade
Commission); W. PROSSER, supra note 18, § 115, at 794-95; Note, supra note 31, at 1297.
34. See Comment, Fair Credit ReportingAct: ConstitutionalDefects of the Limitation
of Liability Clause, 11 Hous. L. REv. 424, 428 (1974); Note, supra note 31, at 1297; Note,
Protecting the Subjects of Credit Reports, 80 YALE L.J. 1035, 1051 (1971).
35. Note, supra note 25, at 255.
36. See 1973 Hearings,supra note 1, at 638-39 (statement of John H.F. Shattuck); id.
at 667 (statement of Lewis A. Engman); Note, supra note 31, at 1297.
37. 1973 Hearings, supra note 1, at 637 (statement of John H.F. Shattuck); see Note,
supra note 31, at 1298.
38. Fair Credit Reporting Act §§ 601-622, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1976), as amended
by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. Im, § 312, 92 Stat. 2549, 2676,
reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS.

39. Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified
in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.) (includes Truth in Lending Act), as amended by
Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, §§ 501-622, 84 Stat. 1114, 1126 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (includes FCRA), as amended by Act of Oct. 28, 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-495, tits. III-V, 88 Stat. 1500, 1511 (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.) (includes Equal Credit Opportunity Act), as amended by Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-205, § 11, 89 Stat. 1157, 1159 (repealing 15 U.S.C. § 1631(c) (1970)), as amended by State Taxation of Depositaries Act, Pub.
L. No. 94-222, § 3, 90 Stat. 197, 197 (1976) (amending scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.),
reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, as amended by Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1691-1691f (1976)), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, as amended by
Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, 90 Stat. 257 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
1601, 1667-1667e (1976)), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, as amended
by Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 501, 91 Stat. 126,
157 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1675 (Supp. 1 1977)), reprinted in 11977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, as amended by Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (Supp. i 1977)), reprinted in
[19771 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, as amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. III, § 312, 92 Stat. 2549, 2676 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§
1673(b)(1)(B), 1681c(a)(1) (1976)), reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, as
amended by Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub.
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begins by stating that "[tlhe banking system is dependent upon fair
and accurate credit reporting,"' 0 and that "[tihere is a need to insure
that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities
with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer's right to
privacy."" The stated purpose of the Act is the protection of these
interests. "
The interests of the commercial sector and of the consumer, however,
are not always compatible. If a prospective creditor needs an accurate
piece of information that can be procured only through- invasion of an
individual's privacy, the interests of the creditor and the individual
conflict. In enacting the FCRA, Congress attempted to balance these
conflicting interests and arrive at an effective and workable piece of
legislation. Despite the intentions of Congress, the FCRA contains gaps
in its protection that need to be closed by supplemental state legislation
to provide adequate protection against credit reporting abuses. Because
many of the deficiencies of the FCRA have resulted from the Act's
definitions and the judicial interpretations of its statutory language, an
analysis of the primary definitions and regulations must precede any
extensive critique of the Act.
A.

The Consumer Report

The definition of a "consumer report," perhaps the most confusing of
the Act's definitions,' 3 poses the FCRA's greatest challenge to judicial
interpretation. Section 1681a(d) defines consumer report, first, as the
communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency."
L. No. 95-630, § 2001, 92 Stat. 3641, 3728 (adding the Electronic Fund Transfer Act),
reprinted in [1978J U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS.
40. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 602(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (1976).
41. Id. § 602(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4).
42. See id. § 604, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(b); 116 CONG. REc. 36572 (1970) (remarks of Rep.
Sullivan); R. CLoNTz, FAIR CREDIT REPORTING MANUAL 1-3 (rev. ed. 1977).
43. The FCRA defines the following terms: person, consumer, consumer report, investigative consumer report, consumer reporting agency, file, employment purposes, and medical information. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603(b)-(i), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(b)-(i)
(1976). For examples of administrative interpretations of the term consumer report, see
Kelly, How the Fair Credit Reporting Act Reaches You and Your Client, 48 HENNEPIN
LAW. 10 (May-June 1979).
44. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1976), which defines
consumer report as follows:
The term "consumer report" means any written, oral, or other communication
of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's
credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be
used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in
establishing the consumer's eligibility for (1) credit or insurance to be used
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, or (2) employment pur-
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Second, the communication must bear relation to a "consumer's credit
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living.""4 The communication
must be "used or expected to be used or collected" for certain purposes.' 6
These purposes include "(1) credit or insurance to be used primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes, or (2) employment purposes,
7
or (3) other purposes authorized under section 1681b of this title.'
This definition becomes complete when cross-referenced with the
"other purposes authorized under section 1681b of this title."" Besides
serving as part of the. FCRA's definition of consumer report, section
1681b is simultaneously a list of the permissible purposes for which
consumer reports may be issued." A report may be furnished in response
to a court order, or according to the written instructions of the subject
consumer." Reporting agencies may give reports to third parties only if
that person intends to use the information for a credit transaction involving the consumer, for employment purposes, for underwriting insurance involving the consumer, or for determining the consumer's eligibility for a governmental license or other benefit. 5' To this is added a catchall provision: a report may be given to any person whom the agency
poses, or (3) other purposes authorized under section 1681b of this title.
Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See id. § 604, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b, which provides:
A consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report under the following circumstances and no other:
(1) In response to the order of a court having jurisdiction to issue such an
order.
(2) In accordance with the written instructions of the consumer to whom it
relates.
(3) To a person which it has reason to believe(A) intends to use the information in connection with a credit transaction
involving the consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the
consumer; or
(B) intends to use the information for employment purposes; or
(C) intends to use the information in connection with the underwriting of
insurance involving the consumer; or
(D) intends to use the information in connection with a determination of
the consumer's eligibility for a license or other benefit granted by a governmental instrumentality required by law to consider an applicant's financial responsibility or status; or
(E) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information in
connection with a business transaction involving the consumer.
50. See id. § 604(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(1)-(2).
51. See id. § 604(3)(A)-(D), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3)(A)-(D).
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reasonably believes "has a legitimate business need for the information
in connection with a business transaction involving the consumer. '52 In
this lengthy manner, sections 1681a(d) and 1681b combine to form the
completed definition of consumer report.
A careful reading of the above sections reveals that this lengthy definition is not a model of statutory clarity. 53 According to section 1681a(d), 51
a consumer report is partially defined by who reports the information, 55
and partially defined by the character of the information reported. 5 The
section also states that the meaning of a consumer report is entirely
dependent upon the purposes for which the information is used or expected to be used.57
This concept of use or expected use of the information presents the
52. Id. § 604(3)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3)(E).
53. See, e.g., Greenway v. Information Dynamics, Ltd., 524 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir.
1975) (per curiam) (Wright, J., dissenting) ("this statutory conundrum"), cert. dismissed,
424 U.S. 936 (1976); Rice v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 450 F. Supp. 668, 670 (M.D.N.C.
1978) ("[Tihe FCRA's detailed and complex requirements have often forced courts to
engage in protracted examination of the Act ....
); Gardner v. Investigators, Inc., 413
F. Supp. 780, 781 (M.D. Fla. 1976) ("a statute which is at best far from clear").
54. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1976).
55. See id. ("any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency"); cf. Greenway v. Information Dynamics, Ltd., 399 F. Supp.
1092, 1095 (D. Ariz. 1974) ("When an agency disseminates information land certain other
requirements are met] . . . then that information is a 'consumer report' . . . .'), aff'd
per curiam, 524 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 424 U.S. 936 (1976).
56. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1976). This section
provides, in part, that the information must bear "on a consumer's credit worthiness,
credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics,
or mode of living." Id. Cases construing this section's requirement have found a consumer
report in various situations. See, e.g., Ley v. Boron Oil Co., 419 F. Supp. 1240, 1242 (W.D.
Pa. 1976) (consumer report must relate to credit or other consumer benefits); Greenway
v. Information Dynamics, Ltd., 399 F. Supp. 1092, 1095 (D. Ariz. 1974) (information
regarding bad check issued by consumer qualified as a consumer report), aff'd per curiam,
524 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 424 U.S. 936 (1976); Porter v. Talbot Perkins
Children's Servs., 355 F. Supp. 174, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (information must be used for
some commercial benefit specified in FCRA before it qualifies as a consumer report).
57. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1976). This section
provides that a consumer report is "any information ...
which is used or expected to be
used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of. . . (1) credit or insurance . . . or
(2) employment purposes, or (3) other purposes authorized under section 1681b." Id.
Numerous cases have construed the meaning of this section. See Hansen v. Morgan, 582
F.2d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 1978); Henry v. Forbes, 433 F. Supp. 5, 8 (D. Minn. 1976); Ley
v. Boron Oil Co., 419 F. Supp. 1240, 1242 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Gardner v. Investigators, Inc.,
413 F. Supp. 780, 781 (M.D. Fla. 1976); Greenway v. Information Dynamics, Ltd., 399 F.
Supp. 1092, 1095 (D. Ariz. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 524 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
dismissed, 424 U.S. 936 (1976); Wrigley v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 969, 97071 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd mem., 500 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1974); Porter v. Talbot Perkins Children's Servs., 355 F. Supp. 174, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Fernandez v. Retail Credit Co., 349
F. Supp. 652, 654 (E.D. La. 1972).
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first infirmity in the definition of a consumer report. Although the
drafters do not explain who "uses" the information, an obvious inference
is that the person who obtains the information is the "user." Certainly,
neither the consumer nor the reporting agency has any direct interest
in using such information for the purposes authorized by the Act. An
inference as to who expects the information to be used for these purposes
is not so easily drawn, however. The consumer, the reporting agency,
and the user might each have an expectation of how the information
should be used. 58
An understanding of "expected to be used" is essential because a
finding that the information is used or expected to be used for one of
the authorized purposes is a prerequisite to a finding that the information is a consumer report. 5 In turn, a finding that the information is a
consumer report must be made before the FCRA is applicable.8 ' With
the meaning of the phrase "expected to be used" neither obvious nor
explained in the Act, courts face obvious difficulties when asked to
interpret the Act and its definition of consumer report. When confronted
with this situation, courts have been forced either to ignore this ambiguous phrase "expected to be used" or second guess Congress by making
the determination of who expects the information to be used for these
specified purposes.8"
The second problem in defining a consumer report under the FCRA
arises from the dual purpose of section 1681b. That section both defines
consumer report 2 and lists the permissible purposes for which consumer
58. See notes 144-69 infra and accompanying text.
59. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1976).
60. See Henry v. Forbes, 433 F. Supp. 5, 10 (D. Minn. 1976); Ley v. Boron Oil Co., 419
F. Supp. 1240, 1243 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Gardner v. Investigators, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 780, 781
(M.D. Fla. 1976); Sizemore v. Bambi Leasing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 252, 255 (N.D. Ga.
1973); Porter v. Talbot Perkins Children's Servs., 355 F. Supp. 174, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
But cf. Rice v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 450 F. Supp. 668, 671 (M.D.N.C. 1978) (section
1681q pertains to all information obtained from a consumer reporting agency, not just
consumer reports).
61. See notes 144-69 infra and accompanying text. Compare Henry v. Forbes, 433 F.
Supp. 5, 8 (D. Minn. 1976) ("[A] report is a 'consumer report' only if it is prepared for
one or more of the specific uses provided in § 1681a and § 1681b.") and Gardner v.
Investigators, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 780, 781 (M.D. Fla. 1976) ("Title 15, § 1681 [sic] defines
a 'consumer report' in terms of its use.") with Hansen v. Morgan, 582 F.2d 1214, 1218 (9th
Cir. 1978) ("[The credit bureau] must have supplied this information with the
expectation that the [defendants] would use it for purposes consistent . . . with the
FCRA .... " (emphasis added)) and Rice v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 450 F. Supp. 668,
672 (M.D.N.C. 1978) ("LTJhe credit report would be a consumer report because it was
expected, by the [credit bureau] to be used for one of the purposes in § 1681a(d)."
(emphasis in original)).
62. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1976) ("[A]
'consumer report' means any. . . communication. . . used. . . for. . . purposes authorized under section 1681b .... ").
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reports can be issued.13 Under the FCRA, a consumer report may not be
issued except for a permissible purpose. If a consumer reporting agency
distributes a consumer report for any but a permissible purpose, it risks
civil or criminal liability.6 ' To determine whether the information is a
consumer report, however, the reader must look to the very same permissible purposes. This result severely limits the FCRA's restrictions on
the use of a consumer report. For example, if certain information is used
for a specified purpose, that information, by definition, is a consumer
report. Because the information was used for a permissible purpose, the
person who issued the report is in compliance with the Act. On the other
hand, if that very same information is used for a purpose not designated
as permissible, the report is not a consumer report. 5 If the report is not
a consumer report, its use is not regulated by the FCRA.16 Consequently,
the section 1681b limitations on the use of a consumer report would not
apply to such information when used for an illegitimate purpose.
Although the FCRA appears to provide civil or criminal liability if a
consumer reporting agency discloses information for any but a permissible purpose, the definition of consumer report could appear to exclude
such liability. The dual nature of section 1681b narrows the definition
of consumer report, which, in turn, limits the FCRA's scope of application, often rendering the limitation on the use of consumer reports absolutely meaningless. Certain misuses of consumer information thereby go
unregulated, diminishing the FCRA's protection of personal privacy.67
63. See id. § 604, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. This section states: "A consumer reporting agency
may furnish a consumer reportunder the following circumstances and no other .
Id.
64. See Hansen v. Morgan, 582 F.2d 1214, 1219 (9th Cir. 1978) (consumer reporting
agency can issue a report only for purposes listed in section 1681b); Belshaw v. Credit
Bureau, 392 F. Supp. 1356, 1360 (D. Ariz. 1975) (issuing a report for a purpose not
permitted by FCRA is a violation of the Act); Fair Credit Reporting Act §§ 616-617, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681n-1681o (1976) (civil liability for failure to comply with any FCRA requirement); id. § 620, 15 U.S.C. § 1681r (criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosure).
65. See Henry v. Forbes, 433 F. Supp. 5, 9-10 (D. Minn. 1976) (report on legislative aide
obtained by lobbyist for undetermined use held not to be a consumer report); Ley v. Boron
Oil Co., 419 F. Supp. 1240, 1243 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (report issued to identify plaintiff as an
attorney not a consumer report); Gardner v. Investigators, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 780, 781
(M.D. Fla. 1976) (report obtained by ex-wife for use in civil action for increased child
support held not to be a consumer report); Porter v. Talbot Perkins Children's Servs., 355
F. Supp. 174, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (report obtained by adoption agency held not to be a
consumer report); Fernandez v. Retail Credit Co., 349 F. Supp. 652, 654 (E.D. La. 1972)
(report on individual's eligibility for insurance issued to corporation held not to be a
consumer report). But see Rice v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 450 F. Supp. 668, 672
(M.D.N.C. 1978) (information obtained for an unauthorized purpose covered by the
FCRA).
66. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
67. See Henry v. Forbes, 433 F. Supp. 5, 10 (D. Minn. 1976); cf. Hansen v. Morgan,
582 F.2d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 1978) (narrow reading of the Act could defeat the FCRA's
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The Consumer Reporting Agency

The FCRA defines a "consumer reporting agency" as "any person
which. . . regularly engages ... in the practice of assembling or evaluating . . . information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing
consumer reports to third parties."" A consumer reporting agency can
be a corporation, an individual, or a government agency, regardless of
whether the activity is undertaken for profit." Simply stated, a consumer reporting agency is any person or entity that issues consumer
70
reports.
When coupled with the definition of consumer report, the statutory
definition of consumer reporting agency reveals some circular reasoning
encompassed within these FCRA terms of art.' While the FCRA defines
a consumer report, in part, as "any. . . communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency,"" it defines a consumer reporting
agency as something which issues consumer reports.73 The resulting definitional circle must be broken before the FCRA can be applied to consumer reports issued by consumer reporting agencies in the context of
actual litigation.
C.

Regulatory Provisions

In addition to delineating the specific permissible purposes for which
consumer reports may be issued'7 the FCRA is comprised of many other
rules and procedures that regulate the activity of credit reporting. Some
of these rules govern the general obligations of a consumer reporting
agency toward every type of consumer report that it might hold. For
example, before a consumer report can be issued, the issuing agency
must know the user's identity and have reason to believe that the report
will be used only for permissible purposes.75 The agency is obligated to
objectives); Rice v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 450 F. Supp. 668, 672 (M.D.N.C. 1978)
(same).
68. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603(0, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (1976) (emphasis added).
69. Id. This section provides that a consumer reporting agency is a "person" which
engages in the activity of furnishing consumer reports. See id. "Person" is defined as "any
individual, partnership, corporation, trust, estate, cooperative, association, government
or governmental subdivision or agency, or other entity." Id. § 603(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(b).
70. See id. § 603(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f).
71. See Porter v. Talbot Perkins Children's Servs., 355 F. Supp. 174, 177-78 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) ("The definition of a consumer reporting agency interlocks with the definition of a
consumer report. A consumer reporting agency is an entity that, in part, issues consumer
reports; a consumer report is a report that, among other things, is issued by a consumer
reporting agency."); R. CLoN4rz, supra note 42, at 1-18. Compare Fair Credit Reporting
Act § 603(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1976) with id. § 608, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(f).
72. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1976).
73. See id. § 603(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f).
74. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
75. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 607(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a) (1976). If a report is
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use reasonable procedures to assure the maximum possible accuracy of
the information that it reports." Even if the information is accurate, the
agency is prohibited from disseminating the information if it is obsolete." Generally, obsolete information includes bankruptcies more than
fourteen years old and any other adverse information more than seven
years old.78 An exception permits obsolete information to be reported
when the report is used for a transaction involving employment at an
annual salary equal to or greater than $20,000, or for transactions involving credit or life insurance worth $50,000 or more.79
Consumers have certain inspection rights under the FCRA. Upon request, a consumer reporting agency must disclose to the consumer the
nature and substance of all information on the consumer contained in
the agency's files." This disclosure requirement pertains only to the
issued for an impermissible purpose, the consumer reporting agency risks liability. See,
e.g., Belshaw v. Credit Bureau, 392 F. Supp. 1356, 1360 (D. Ariz. 1975) (issuing a report
for a purpose not permitted by FCRA is violation of the Act).
Whether a consumer reporting agency can release information in response to the order
of a government agency or grand jury subpoena without violating the FCRA is a matter
of dispute. See FTC v. Manager, Retail Credit Co., 515 F.2d 988, 992-98 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(FTC subpoena enforceable without court order); In re TRW, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D.
Mich. 1978) (grand jury subpoena is a court order within meaning of FCRA); In re Credit
Information Corp., 457 F.Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (grand jury subpoena is not a court
order within meaning of FCRA); United States v. Puntorieri, 379 F. Supp. 332 (E.D.N.Y.
1974) (IRS summons requires court order for enforcement); United States v. Bremicker,
365 F. Supp. 701 (D. Minn. 1973) (IRS summons does not require a court order); Kansas
Comm'n on Civil Rights v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 216 Kan. 306, 320-21, 532 P.2d 1263,
1275-76 (1975) (compliance with subpoena of state agency will not violate FCRA). See
generally Fair Credit Reporting Act § 604(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(1) (1976) (court order is
a permissible purpose for which a consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer
report); id. § 621(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a) (enforcement of FCRA generally delegated to
FTC); see also Ollestad v. Kelley, 573 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1978) (federal agencies such as
the FBI are not consumer reporting agencies under FCRA).
76. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 607(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (1976). A consumer
reporting agency can be held liable under the FCRA for reporting false information if it
failed to use reasonable procedures to assure accuracy. See, e.g., Collins v. Retail Credit
Co., 410 F. Supp. 924, 927-28, 931 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports,
Inc., 383 F. Supp. 269, 275 (E.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd, 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976); Rasor v.
Retail Credit Co., 87 Wash. 2d 516, 517-20, 554 P.2d 1041, 1043-45 (1976). Conversely,
the truthfulness of the information reported is a defense to the claim of failure to use
reasonable procedures. See, e.g., Roseman v. Retail Credit Co., 428 F. Supp. 643, 646
(E.D. Pa. 1977); Middlebrooks v. Retail Credit Co., 416 F. Supp. 1013, 1015-16 (N.D.
Ga. 1976).
77. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 605(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) (1976), as amended
by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. III, § 312, 92 Stat. 2549, 2676,
reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS.
78. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 605(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) (1976), as amended
by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. III, § 312, 92 Stat. 2549, 2676,
reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS.
79. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 605(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(b) (1976).
80. See id. § 609(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1). The failure to make full disclosure can
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nature and substance of the information; disclosure of an actual copy
of the consumer's file is not required." The reporting agency must reveal
the sources of its information, except when the information is acquired
and used solely in preparing an investigative consumer report. 2 Agencies also must disclose the names of recent recipients of any reports on
the consumer.1 The FCRA provides the consumer with the means to
ascertain whether the information contained in the credit file is accurate. If the file contains erroneous information, the consumer may notify
the agency that he disputes the accuracy of the file.8 4 Upon notification
the agency must either delete the information or verify its truthfulness. 5
If the consumer still disputes the accuracy of the information after reinvestigation by the consumer reporting agency, the consumer may have
his own statement of reasons for the dispute inserted in the file."6 Subsequently issued reports on that consumer must note that the information
is disputed and must provide a copy or summary of the consumer's
87
version of the disputed information to the recipient.
Users of consumer reports have responsibilities under the FCRA as
result in the imposition of liability upon a consumer reporting agency. See Collins v. Retail
Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924, 927-28 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (jury verdict awarding damages
for, inter alia, failure to make full disclosure upheld); cf. Ackerley v. Credit Bureau of
Sheridan, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 658, 659 (D. Wyo. 1974) (defendant's motion for summary
judgment denied in cause of action based on failure to make disclosure upon request).
81. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 609(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1) (1976).
82. See id. § 609(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(2).
83. See id. § 609(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(3).
84. See id. § 611(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a). While consumers have the right to dispute
the accuracy of information contained in their credit file, the FCRA does not place an
affirmative duty on a consumer reporting agency to notify consumers of this right. See
Todd v. Associated Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 447,449 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd
mem., 378 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir, 1978); Roseman v. Retail Credit Co., 428 F. Supp. 643, 646
(E.D. Pa. 1977); Middlebrooks v. Retail Credit Co., 416 F. Supp. 1013, 1017-18 (N.D. Ga.

1976).
85. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 611(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a) (1976) (reinvestigation
not required if agency has reasonable grounds to believe dispute is frivolous or irrelevant).
Liability can result from a consumer reporting agency's failure to delete inaccurate information as required under the FCRA. See id. § 611(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(d); cf. Conley v.
TRW Credit Data, 381 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. 11. 1974) (wife has standing to join husband
in suit alleging failure to delete inaccurate information).
86. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 611(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(b) (1976).
87. See id. § 611(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(c). A consumer has not only the right to dispute
inaccurate information in his credit file, but also the right to insist that future users of
that information be notified by the credit bureau that it is disputed. The bureau must
include a copy of the consumer's version of the dispute in any subsequent credit reports,
unless reasonable grounds exist to believe the dispute is frivolous or irrelevant. See id. The
reporting agency is not required to inform the consumer of the right to notify subsequent
users of the dispute, nor of the right to have the consumer's version of the dispute sent to
the user. See, e.g., Middlebrooks v. Retail Credit Co., 416 F. Supp. 1013, 1017-18 (N.D.
Ga. 1976).
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well.88 If a consumer is denied insurance, credit, or employment because
of information contained in a consumer report, the person who used the
information must notify the consumer that such action was taken because of information contained in the report.89 Similarly, if the cost of
credit or insurance to the consumer is increased because of such information, the consumer must be notified.' 0 In either circumstance, the
user must provide the consumer with the name and address of the consumer reporting agency issuing the report."
D.

Remedies

If the provisions of the FCRA are complied with, the consumer reporting agency is granted immunity from suits for defamation, negligence,
and invasion of privacy. 2 Because these common law remedies were
fraught with difficulties and were largely ineffective, their partial demise has not been mourned. 3 If a reporting agency issues false information with either malice or a willful intent to injure the consumer, however, immunity from common law tort liability disappears.' In these
instances, the actions for defamation, negligence, and invasion of pri88. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 615, 15 U.S.C. § 1681m (1976) (requiring user of
consumer report to notify consumer why credit or insurance was denied or why cost of
credit or insurance was increased); id. § 619, 15 U.S.C. § 1681q (establishing criminal
penalty for obtaining "information on a consumer from a consumer reporting agency
under false pretenses"); id. § 620, 15 U.S.C. § 1681r (criminal penalty imposed upon
officer or employee of consumer reporting agency for knowingly providing information to
third party who does not have proper authority to receive the information); cf. Rice v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 450 F. Supp. 668, 670 (M.D.N.C. 1978) (only in sections 1681d,
1681m, 1681q, and 1681r does the FCRA place requirements upon persons who are not
consumer reporting agencies). See generally Fair Credit Reporting Act § 606, 15 U.S.C. §
1681d (1976) (special provision applying to investigative consumer reports).
89. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 615(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (1976).
90. See id.
91. See id. Failure to do so can result in the user being held liable for violating the Act.
See Carroll v. Exxon Co., 434 F. Supp. 557, 559-61 (E.D. La. 1977).
92. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 610(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (1976) provides:
[Nbo consumer may bring any action or proceeding in the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence with respect to the reporting of information against any consumer reporting agency, or any user of information . . .
except as to false information furnished with malice or willful intent to injure
such consumer.
Id.; see 116 CONG. REc. 36573 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Sullivan).
93. See notes 18-37 supra and accompanying text.
94. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 610(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (1976); cf. Peller v. Retail
Credit Co., 359 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (absent an allegation of malice or
willful intent to injure the consumer, common law tort claims cannot be maintained under
the FCRA), aff'd mem., 505 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1974). The practitioner should be careful
not to split his cause of action. Once an action has been dismissed because the FCRA is
inapplicable, a second action under common law tort theory can be barred by res judicata.
See Ley v. Boron Oil Co., 454 F. Supp. 448, 451 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
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vacy remain in force as additional theories of recovery." When the
FCRA is inapplicable, as when the definition of consumer report is not
satisfied, the Act does not preempt the common law."
In addition to this limited retention of common law remedies, the
FCRA has generated substantive rights for consumers that did not exist
at common law." Under the Act, consumers can bring actions against
an agency for failure to disclose information,' 8 or for failure to conduct
a proper investigation of disputed information," and against a user for
obtaining information from a consumer reporting agency under false
pretenses.'0 If an agency or user has negligently failed to comply with
the Act, the injured consumer can recover actual damages and attorney's fees."' For a willful failure to comply, the consumer additionally
95. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 610(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (1976).
96. Common law tort actions are forbidden when based upon information revealed
pursuant to the Act's disclosure provisions. See id. The Act's disclosure provisions relate
only to information held or disseminated by a consumer reporting agency. See id. §§ 609610, 615, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681g-1681h, 1681m. A consumer reporting agency, as discussed
earlier, is something that issues consumer reports. See id. § 603(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f);
notes 68-73 supra and accompanying text. Thus, a protracted analysis of the Act as a
whole leads to the conclusion that consumer reports are required as a prerequisite to the
effectiveness of the Act's disclosure provisions.
97. See Ackerley v. Credit Bureau of Sheridan, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 658, 659 (D. Wyo.
1974) ("The Act has codified certain aspects of the common law doctrines of defamation
and imposed certain new requirements.").
98. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 609, 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (1976) (requiring agency to
disclose information upon request); id. § 616, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (civil liability for willful
failure to comply with any requirement of the Act); id. § 617, 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (civil
liability for negligent failure). For examples of actions brought by consumers against an
agency for failure to disclose information, see Collins v. Retail Credit Co., 410 F. Supp.
924 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Ackerley v. Credit Bureau of Sheridan, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 658 (D.
Wyo. 1974); Millstone v. O'Hanion Reports, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd,
528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976).
99. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 611(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a) (1976) (requiring
consumer reporting agencies to reinvestigate disputed information); id. § 616, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681n (civil liability for willful failure to comply with any requirement of the Act); id.
§ 617, 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (civil liability for negligent failure). For examples of actions
brought by consumers against an agency for failure to conduct a reinvestigation properly,
see Collins v. Retail Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Millstone v.
O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd, 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir.
1976); Conley v. TRW Credit Data, 381 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. I1. 1974).
100. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 619, 15 U.S.C. § 1681q (1976) (prohibiting anyone
from obtaining information on a consumer from a reporting agency under false pretenses);
id. § 616, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (civil liability for willful failure to comply with any requirement of the Act); id. § 617, 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (civil liability for negligent failure). For
examples of actions brought by consumers against users for obtaining information under
false pretenses, see Hansen v. Morgan, 582 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1978); Rice v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 450 F. Supp. 668 (M.D.N.C. 1978).
101. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 617(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(1)-(2) (1976).
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may recover punitive damages. 2 Consumers may bring FCRA actions
in any federal district court or state court of general jurisdiction.'"

IV.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FAmr CREDrr REPORTING

Acr

Inconsistent interpretations of the FCRA by the courts have thwarted
the Act's remedial purposes of guarding against false reports and invasions of privacy. Because of these varying interpretations, neither consumers nor reporting agencies can be certain of their rights and obligations under this Act. By its terms, the FCRA applies only to consumer
reports."' Therefore, the existence of a consumer report, as defined in
the Act, is a prerequisite to successfully maintaining a civil action under
the FCRA. The difficulties encountered in determining whether a report
is in fact a consumer report are unfortunate. In those situations in which
the existence of a consumer report is not obvious, the courts cannot turn
to the definition for guidance. The lack of clarity in the statutory language produces conflicting decisions as courts attempt to determine
what Congress meant to include in the term.'"0
A.

The Purpose of the Report

The purpose for which a report is issued controls the definition of a
consumer report.'" The courts, unfortunately, do not agree on the exact
102. See id. § 616(1)-(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(1)-(3). For examples of such recoveries
under the FCRA, see Collins v. Retail Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924, 928, 933 (E.D. Mich.
1976) (jury awarded $300,000 punitive damages; remittitur to $50,000); Millstone v.
O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 269, 276 (E.D. Mo. 1974) ($2,500 actual damages;
$25,000 punitive; $12,500 in attorney's fees plus costs), aff'd, 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976);
Nitti v. Credit Bureau of Rochester, Inc., 84 Misc. 2d 277, 375 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct.
1975) ($10,000 punitive damages; $8,000 attorney's fees).
103. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 618(p), 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (1976) ("An action to enforce
any liability created under [the FCRA] may be brought in any appropriate United States
district court without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction.
104. See id. §§ 601-622, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t, as amended by Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. I1, § 312, 92 Stat. 2549, 2676, reprinted in 119781
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS; cf. Henry v. Forbes, 433 F. Supp. 5, 10 (D. Minn. 1976)
("['The coverage of the Fair Credit Reporting Act is so narrow that action by a credit
reporting agency generally is not within the ambit of the Act unless the information is
gathered for use in a 'consumer report.' "); R. CLonz, supra note 42, at 1-21 to -25 (rev.
ed. 1977 & Supp. 1978).
105. This problem was anticipated by at least one member of Congress before the Act
was passed. See 116 CONG. REc. 36576 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Brown) ("[T]here is
considerable confusion about how this bill will be interpreted. The definitions are so vague
that no one is certain what is included as a 'consumer credit report' nor who or what is to
be construed as a 'consumer credit reporting agency.' ").
106. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1976); notes 62-67
supra and accompanying text.
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role that the purpose plays." 7 A narrow reading of the FCRA's definition
of a consumer report can lead to the conclusion that only those reports
actually issued for the Act's specifically designated purposes are consumer reports. A report issued for any other purpose therefore could not
be a consumer report. Some courts have followed this reasoning, holding
that reports on private individuals, when issued for a purpose not specified in the Act, do not constitute consumer reports.0 8 Accordingly, these
courts conclude that an FCRA violation cannot occur because a consumer report is not involved."
In Sizemore v. Bambi Leasing Corp.,"" the plaintiff wanted to lease
business equipment from the defendant Bambi."' When Bambi contemplated selling the lease to the defendant bank, the bank sought a credit
report on the Sizemore Company,"' and received a business report favorable to Sizemore but inconclusive."' An unfavorable personal credit
report on Mr. Sizemore was obtained by the bank from the defendant
credit bureau."' After the bank refused to buy the lease, and Bambi
refused to enter into the lease agreement with Sizemore, Bambi informed Sizemore that the rejection was not based upon any information
obtained from the consumer reporting agency."'
Sizemore brought suit against the leasing corporation, the bank, and
the credit reporting agency, alleging a violation of the FCRA. A Georgia
107. Compare, e.g., Belshaw v. Credit Bureau, 392 F. Supp. 1356, 1359-60 (D. Ariz.
1975) (used or expected to be used for any purpose allowable within section 1681a(d)) with,
e.g., Henry v. Forbes, 433 F. Supp. 5, 8 (D. Minn. 1976) (prepared for one of the specific
uses allowable).
108. See Henry v. Forbes, 433 F. Supp. 5, 8-9 (D. Minn. 1976) ("Defendants correctly
assert that the report on plaintiff prepared by Retail Credit was not an 'investigative
consumer report' because, while it contained some of the information described by the
statute, it was not prepared for any of the enumerated purposes."); Gardner v. Investigators, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 780, 781 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (complaint fails to state a cause of action
when report not prepared for any of the enumerated purposes in FCRA); Wrigley v. Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 969, 970 (N.D. Ga.) (use of credit report for determining
whether commercial credit should be extended falls outside ambit of FCRA), aff'd mem.,
500 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1974); Sizemore v. Bambi Leasing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 252, 254
(N.D. Ga. 1973) (application for commercial credit not within the cloak of protection
afforded by the Act); Porter v. Talbot Perkins Children's Servs., 355 F. Supp. 174, 178
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (child adoption agencies are not subject to obligations provided by
FCRA); Fernandez v. Retail Credit Co., 349 F. Supp. 652, 654 (E.D. La. 1972) (report used
to establish eligibility for business insurance not a consumer report under the Act); Krumholz v. TRW, Inc., 142 N.J. Super. 80, 84, 360 A.2d 413, 415 (App. Div. 1976) (bank
mortgage loan transaction report falls outside protection of the Act).
109. See cases cited in note 108 supra.
110. 360 F. Supp. 252 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
111. See id. at 253.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
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Federal District Court dismissed Sizemore's complaint, finding that the
report was not a consumer report within the meaning of the FCRA."16
The court explained that the personal credit report was issued for the
purpose of business credit, not for the purpose of personal, family, or
household credit."' Because business credit is not one of the purposes
listed in the FCRA, no violation of the Act occurred." 8 In considering
only the actual use of the credit information to determine whether the
FCRA applied,"' the court narrowed the definition of consumer report,
thereby limiting the applicability of the FCRA.
By adopting a broader definition of the term consumer report, other
courts have imposed liability for the misuse of personal credit reports,
even though the reports were actually used for a purpose not specifically
designated in the Act.'"0 The Washington Supreme Court recently followed this approach in Rasor v. Retail Credit Co. '1' In Rasor the plaintiff, a motel operator, applied for a small business loan to build additional rooms for her motel.'2 2 As security for the loan, the plaintiff had
to obtain life insurance.'12 Before issuing a policy, the life insurance
company procured a report from the defendant, a credit reporting
2
agency.'"
The report stated that the plaintiff "had a reputation of living
with more than one man out of wedlock."'7 The life insurance company
refused to issue a policy and properly notified the plaintiff that its
decision was influenced by a report from the defendant.'2 When the
plaintiff disputed the information contained in the report, the defen116. See id. at 254-55.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 255.
119. See id. at 254.
120. See Hansen v. Morgan, 582 F.2d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 1978) (credit report obtained
by merchant for political purposes was a "consumer report" within the Act); Hoke v.
Retail Credit Corp., 521 F.2d 1079, 1083-84 (4th Cir. 1975) (personal report issued to state
board of medical examiners, which requested report to determine physician's application
for license to practice medicine, held to be a consumer report), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087
(1976); Rice v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 450 F. Supp. 668, 671-72 (M.D.N.C. 1978)
(report issued after plaintiff filed a complaint under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
was a consumer report); Belshaw v. Credit Bureau, 392 F. Supp. 1356, 1359-60 (D. Ariz.
1975) (any report "that could be used for one of the purposes enumerated in § 1681a" is a
consumer report (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)); Greenway v. Information
Dynamics, Ltd., 399 F. Supp. 1092, 1095 (D. Ariz. 1974) (business that supplied check
cashing information on potential customers supplied consumer reports), aff'd per curiam,
524 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 424 U.S. 936 (1976); Rasor v. Retail Credit
Co., 87 Wash. 2d 516, 520-23, 554 P.2d 1041, 1045-46 (1976) (insurance report to be used
for "personal purposes" held to be a consumer report).
121. 87 Wash. 2d 516, 554 P.2d 1041 (1976).
122. Id. at 518, 554 P.2d at 1043-44.
123. Id. at 518-19, 554 P.2d at 1044.
124. See id. at 519, 554 P.2d at 1044.
125. Id. at 518, 554 P.2d at 1044.
126. See id. at 519, 554 P.2d at 1044.
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dant reinvestigated.'" A second report was issued, which stated that the
plaintiff and her boyfriend "do not live together.""' Subsequently, the
plaintiff was able to obtain life insurance, but at a higher cost.' 29 She
brought an action against Retail Credit Company for issuing an inaccurate report.'1° The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the de3
fendant appealed.1'
The threshold question facing the Supreme Court of Washington was
whether the report was a consumer report as defined by the FCRA and
thereby fell within the Act.3 2 The information had been assembled ini'
tially by the defendant for purposes of personal credit or insurance. 3
According to the court, the information was therefore a consumer report.'1 The court further found that the defendant's act of reissuing the
report for the purpose of business insurance did not change the character
of the report.'1 Although the report was issued for life insurance for the
plaintiff's business, the court held that it was still a consumer report
within the meaning of the FCRA'm and the plaintiff therefore was entitled to the protections of the Act. "'
Rasor presented a factual situation substantially similar to Sizemore.
Both cases involved personal reports on private individuals issued for
business purposes.'1 Nevertheless, the two courts reached opposite results.' 3' The Sizemore court reasoned that, because the report was issued

for a business purpose, it was not a consumer report.'" ° Antithetically,
the Rasor court ignored the actual use of the report, looking instead to
the purpose for which the information was originally collected."'1 Relying
on what it saw as a factual distinction, the Rasor court attempted to
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 520, 554 P.2d at 1044.
130. See id. at 520, 554 P.2d at 1045.
131. See id. at 517-18, 554 P.2d at 1043.
132. See id. at 521, 554 P.2d at 1045.
133. See id. at 518, 554 P.2d at 1043-44.
134. See id. at 523-25, 554 P.2d at 1046-47.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 525, 554 P.2d at 1047.
138. Compare Sizemore v. Bambi Leasing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 252, 253 & n.1 (N.D. Ga.
1973) with Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wash. 2d 516, 521-22, 554 P.2d 1041, 1045-46
(1976).
139. Compare Sizemore v. Bambi Leasing Corp , 360 F. Supp. 252, 254 (N.D. Ga. 1973)
("It is manifest that the use of a credit report in connection with a lease application for
business purposes . . . is therefore without the cloak of protection afforded by the Act.")
with Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wash. 2d 516, 525, 554 P.2d 1041, 1047 (1976) ("[The]
report prepared by appellant was a 'consumer report' entitled to the protections of the
Fair Credit Reporting Act.").
140. See 360 F. Supp. at 254.
141. See 87 Wash. 2d at 522-24, 554 P.2d at 1045-47.
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reconcile its holding with that of the court in Sizemore. The court contended that its case was different because the report on the plaintiff
possibly could have been used in a consumer transaction." ' The conclusion, however, ignored the fact that the Sizemore report also could have
been used in a consumer transaction. '"
The real distinction between the two cases is the difference in interpretation of the term consumer report. The broader interpretation in
Rasor expands the applicability of the FCRA, while the narrower interpretation of Sizemore restricts the applicability of the Act. Thus, when
a reporting agency issues a personal report on a private individual for
business purposes, the consumer is protected by the FCRA if the reasoning of Rasor is followed, but not if the Sizemore interpretation is
adopted. The extent of protection, therefore, depends on the jurisdiction
in which the FCRA action is brought.
B.

The Expected Use of the Report

The FCRA defines consumer report as information "used or expected
to be used" for various purposes.1 " The seemingly innocuous phrase
"expected to be used" has plagued the courts with its inherent ambiguity. Arguably, a reporting agency, or a user of a consumer report, might
expect information compiled by a reporting agency to be used for the
FCRA's designated permissible purposes. This expectation of use could
occur at the time the information is collected or at the time a user
requests the information. Whenever the expectation of use occurs, however, it fulfills the definitional requirements, qualifying the information
as a consumer report. Perhaps trying to ignore this ambiguous phrase,
most courts do not discuss expected use when they attempt to define a
consumer report.' 5 The reasons for the general reluctance of courts to
discuss the concept of expected use are still a matter of conjecture, for
the courts neither state the reasons in their decisions nor make them
apparent.
In Belshaw v. Credit Bureau,'41 however, the court at least recognized
the existence of the phrase." 7 In Belshaw, the plaintiff sued the defendant credit bureau for issuing a report on the plaintiff for some unspecified purpose, concededly a purpose not designated as permissible by the
142. See id. at 523, 554 P.2d at 1046.
143. See Sizemore v. Bambi Leasing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 252, 255 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (fact
that defendant credit bureau handled only personal credit reports deemed irrelevant to
issue of whether the report was a "consumer report").
144. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1976).
145. See cases cited in note 108 supra.
146. 392 F. Supp. 1356 (D. Ariz. 1975).
147. Id. at 1359-60 (any report "that could be used for one of the purposes enumerated
in § 1681a" is a consumer report (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)).
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Act. " " In moving to dismiss, the defendant argued that, because the
report was not issued for a permissible purpose, it could not be a consumer report within the meaning of the Act."' The Arizona Federal
District Court rejected this argument, finding that a consumer report is
any "information that could be used for one of the purposes enumerated" in the Act.10 The court reasoned that restricting the definition of
consumer report to those reports used only for certain purposes "flies in
the face of the legislative intent.""'' Furthermore, the Belshaw court
found the broader reading of the definition, which it adopted, better
promoted the congressional purpose of protecting individual privacy. 5
In Rasor, the Supreme Court of Washington followed the analysis of
Belshaw in adopting the broader reading of the term expected use.'1
But, although both courts mentioned the phrase "expected to be used,"
they did not elaborate upon its meaning.'
In failing to specify who must expect the information to be used in a
certain manner, the FCRA appears to contemplate some ethereal person
carrying this expectation. Because the phrase may be interpreted by
objective or subjective standards,'" the already ambiguous definition of
consumer report is further clouded. To resolve the problem, both
Belshaw and Rasor indicate that an objective determination of expected
use should be made.5 6 If the information is reasonably capable of being
used for the Act's purposes, it will qualify as a consumer report. However, a subjective determination seems equally possible. Under this approach, if one of the parties to the transaction-and the FCRA does not
specify which party-actually expected the report to be used for the
designated purposes, the information will qualify as a consumer report.

5 7

148. See id. at 1358-59.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 1359-60 (emphasis in original).
151. Id. at 1359.
152. See id.
153. See Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wash. 2d 516, 522-23, 554 P.2d 1041, 1046 (1976).
154. See Belshaw v. Credit Bureau, 392 F. Supp. 1356, 1359-60 (D. Ariz. 1975); Rasor
v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wash. 2d 516, 522-23, 554 P.2d 1041, 1046 (1976).
155. Compare Hansen v. Morgan, 582 F.2d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 1978) and Rice v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 450 F. Supp. 668, 672 (M.D.N.C. 1978) with Belshaw v. Credit
Bureau, 392 F. Supp. 1356, 1359-60 (D. Ariz. 1975) and Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87
Wash. 2d 516, 522-23, 554 P.2d 1041, 1046 (1976).
156. See Belshaw v. Credit Bureau, 392 F. Supp. 1356, 1359-60 (D. Ariz. 1975); Rasor
v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wash. 2d 516, 522-23, 554 P.2d 1041, 1046 (1976); cf. Lee v.
Bishop's Serv., Inc., No. 76-3729 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1978) ("[Tihe Court concludes that
a report is a 'consumer report' if it objectively comes within the definition of § 1681a(d)."
(emphasis added)).
157. See Hansen v. Morgan, 582 F.2d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 1978) ("['rjhe Pocatello
Credit Bureau . . . supplied this information with the expectation that [defendants]
would use it for purposes consistent . . . with the FCRA . . . . As such it is a consumer
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In Rice v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,'" the North Carolina Federal
District Court adopted a subjective determination of expected use. The
plaintiff in Rice had applied for a credit card from the defendant Montgomery Ward.' When her application was rejected, she sued for violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,'6" claiming she was denied
credit because of her status as a divorced woman.'' The defendant
procured two credit reports on the plaintiff to be used in litigating the
original claim.' Alleging that the defendant had procured the consumer
reports under false pretenses, in violation of the FCRA, the plaintiff
moved to file a supplemental complaint.' In challenging the plaintiff's
motion, the defendant argued that these reports were not consumer
reports because they were obtained for purposes other than those specified in the Act.' The court granted the plaintiffs motion, finding that
these were consumer reports because the reporting agency expected
them to be used for the purposes designated in the Act.' 5 In reaching
its conclusion, the court gave additional meaning to the phrase
"expected to be used" by deciding that it refers to that use expected by
the consumer reporting agency issuing the report."'
With so many courts avoiding the issue, the Rice court should be
commended for struggling with the concept of expected use. The Rice
opinion presents a well-reasoned approach to the clarification of a significant ambiguity within the FCRA. Because the Act already requires
reporting agencies to use reasonable procedures to ascertain the user's
identity and purpose,' 7 a reporting agency is in a position to have expecreport under the FCRA." (emphasis added)); Rice v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 450 F.
Supp. 668, 672 (M.D.N.C. 1978) ("[T~he credit report would be a consumer report because it was expected, by the [credit bureau] to be used for one of the purposes in §
1681a(d)." (emphasis in original)); Greenway v. Information Dynamics, Ltd., 399 F. Supp.
1092, 1095 (D. Ariz. 1974) ("When . . .the agency knows or expects that [the information] will be used [for one of the purposes in § 1681b] then that information is a
'consumer report'." (emphasis added)), aff'd per curiam, 524 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. dismissed, 424 U.S. 936 (1976).
158. 450 F. Supp. 668 (M.D.N.C. 1978).
159. Id. at 669.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 669-70.
162. See id. at 670.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 671.
165. See id. at 672.
166. Id. at 672; accord, Hansen v. Morgan, 582 F.2d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 1978); Greenway v. Information Dynamics, Ltd., 399 F. Supp. 1092, 1095 (D. Ariz. 1974), aff'd per
curiam, 524 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 424 U.S. 936 (1976).
167. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 607(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a) (1976). This section
provides:
Every consumer reporting agency shall maintain reasonable procedures . ...
These procedures shall require that prospective users of the information identify
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tations concerning the use of the report.'" The court's choice of a subjective determination, however, creates a potential problem. If the reporting agency expects to issue the report for a nonpermissible purpose, and
if the report is actually used for a nonpermissible purpose, the report
will fail to meet the technical requirements of the consumer report definition. In these circumstances, because the agency's subjective determination of expected use would control whether the report would qualify
as a consumer report, consumer protection would depend on being able
to prove the actual expectations of the issuing agency. It can hardly be
argued that the FCRA drafters intended to rely upon reporting agency
discretion to determine whether a consumer report is present.'
C.

The FCRA in Minnesota

In Minnesota, the enactment of the FCRA expanded the remedies
available for credit reporting abuses. Under the common law in Minnesota, a consumer could recover damages only if the defendant had maliciously furnished false information.7 0 While retaining this recovery, the
FCRA has supplemented it with recovery for any failure to comply with
the Act, even though neither malice nor false statements are present.'
By providing easier standards of proof and abolishing the qualified privilege to defame, the FCRA seemingly has increased the protection of
individual privacy in Minnesota. In Henry v. Forbes,"I however, the
Minnesota Federal District Court narrowed the scope of protection provided by the Act. The plaintiff, Betty Henry, was an aide and secretary
to a state legislator.7 3 The defendant, Forbes, was a lobbyist, working
themselves, certify the purposes for which the information is sought, and certify
that the information will be used for no other purpose ....
No consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report to any person if it has reasonable grounds for believing that the consumer report will not be used for a purpose listed in section 1681b of this title.

Id.
168. See Hansen v. Morgan, 582 F.2d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 1978).
169. Cf. id. at 1220 ("ITihe objectives of the act could be defeated if users could obtain
information from consumer reporting agencies under false pretenses with impunity.");
Hoke v. Retail Credit Corp., 521 F.2d 1079, 1083-84 (4th Cir. 1975) (reading the definition
of consumer report as restrictively as argued by the reporting agency would limit the
FCRA's coverage rather than the reporting agency's activities), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087
(1976); Lee v. Bishop's Serv., Inc., No. 76-3729 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1978) ("It would subvert
both the language and the intent of the legislation to allow a reporting agency to claim
exemption whenever it is merely informed that the purposes for the report are legitimate
within the meaning of § 1681b.").
170. See notes 23-37 supra and accompanying text.
171. See Fair Credit Reporting Act §§ 616-617, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n-1681o (1976); 1973
Hearings, supra note 1, at 667 (statement of Lewis A. Engman).
172. 433 F. Supp. 5 (D. Minn. 1976).
173. See id. at 7.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol5/iss2/2

24

et al.: Minnesota and the Fair Credit Reporting Act: A Proposed Reform of
19791

FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT

on behalf of the Minnesota Railroads Association.' Forbes obtained
information from the defendant Retail Credit Company on the plaintiff's personal background, employment, and financial status for an
undetermined use in connection with his work as a lobbyist." 5 The person who contacted Retail Credit explained that the information was
needed to process a claim for damages against a railroad.'7 6 Upon discovering that she was being investigated, Henry brought an action alleging
that the investigation had been conducted in a manner that violated her
rights under the FCRA. 71 The court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, holding that the facts as alleged did not fall within
the ambit of the FCRA, 17' because the court found that the report was
not a consumer report in that it had been issued for a purpose other than
those enumerated in the Act. 7 ' The court reasoned that the definition
of a consumer report is entirely dependent upon the purpose for which
the report is requested.'s' The defendant may not have had any legitimate need or use for the report when it was requested, but because the
report was not issued for any of the FCRA's specified purposes, it was
not covered by the Act.' The reasoning in Henry resembles that of
Sizemore and its progeny. Not only did the Henry court decline to follow
the broader definitional approach embraced by the Belshaw and Rasor
courts, Henry also criticized the Belshaw decision as reading nonexistent provisions into the FCRA. s8 Henry departs from Belshaw and Rasor
in that it failed to discuss the concept of expected use. 83 Instead, Henry
relied on actual use and adopted the narrower interpretation of consumer report. 184
174. Id. at 6.
175. See id. at 7.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 6-7.
178. Id. at 10-11.
179. See id. at 9-10.
180. See id. at 8.
181. See id. at 10.
182. See id. at 9 ("Unfortunately, despite the ambiguities, the Court cannot read into
"). Compare
the statute provisions that do not exist, as did the court in Belshaw ....
id. (criticizing Belshaw) with Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wash. 2d 516, 522-23, 554 P.2d
1041, 1046 (1976) (relying on Belshaw).
183. Compare Henry v. Forbes, 433 F. Supp. 5, 10 (D. Minn. 1976) ("[Alction by a
credit reporting agency generally is not within the ambit of the Act unless the information
is gathered for use in a 'consumer report.' ") with Belshaw v. Credit Bureau, 392 F. Supp.
1356, 1359-60 (D. Ariz. 1975) ("[To be meaningful, 'consumer report' must be interpreted to mean any report made by a credit reporting agency of information that could
be used for one of the purposes enumerated in § 1681a." (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted)) and Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wash. 2d 516, 522, 554 P.2d 1041, 1046 (1976)
(the character of a consumer report "may not be changed by its subsequent use for
business purposes").
184. See 433 F. Supp. at 9-10.
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Thus, the FCRA, as it has been interpreted by a Minnesota Federal
District Court judge, provides no remedy for certain misuses of information on consumers. 5 The result is less protection for Minnesota consumers than for consumers in jurisdictions adopting the broader reading of
the FCRA. The Rice court recognized this when, criticizing Henry, it
stated:
[Montgomery Ward's] position is fully supported by the District
Court's decision in Henry v. Forbes. .

.

. [This] Court, however, must

decline to follow the decision in Henr because, as this court views it,
the Henry court's restrictive view of the FCRA's scope is not supported
by the language of § 1681a(d). Furthermore, if this court were to hold
that the FCRA does not apply where the recipient of the information
obtains it for an unauthorized purpose, it would undermine the consumer's right to privacy, one of the policies underlying the FCRA.1s'
By adopting a restrictive definition of consumer report, Henry limits
the applicability of the FCRA to those situations in which the report
actually is used for a designated purpose. If a consumer applies for a
credit card, and the creditor obtains information from a consumer reporting agency, the consumer will be protected from the dissemination
of false information and from invasions of privacy. If an enemy or a
stranger wants the information for a nonexistent or illegitimate purpose,
on the other hand, the Minnesota consumer will not be protected by the
FCRA, regardless of how the information might reasonably be expected
to be used.8 7 Under Henry, expected use is not considered. As the Henry
court itself noted, its decision permits protection under the FCRA only
for very limited uses of personal credit information and potentially permits flagrant abuses to go unchecked.'" The result is less protection for
the Minnesota consumer.' By leaving a wide gap in the Act's protective
mechanisms, permitting certain misuses of consumer credit information
to go unchallenged, and thereby diminishing the protection of personal
185. Id. at 10 ("[TIhe Act clearly does not provide a remedy for all illicit or abusive
use of information about consumers."); see id. at 11 ("[lIndividuals are not protected
against abuse of the credit reporting apparatus unless their circumstances are within the
narrow bounds of coverage under the Act.").
186. Rice v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 450 F. Supp. 668, 672 (M.D.N.C. 1978) (footnote
omitted).
187. See Henry v. Forbes, 433 F. Supp. 5, 10 (D. Minn. 1976) ("If defendant Forbes had
had an unsavory or illegal purpose in having plaintiffs background investigated, the
information could not be part of a 'consumer report'-and plaintiff would have had no
remedy ....
).
188. See id. at 11 ("[IJndividuals are not protected against abuse of the credit reporting apparatus unless their circumstances are within the narrow bounds of coverage under
the Act.").
189. Compare id. at 9-11 with Rice v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 450 F. Supp. 668, 672
(M.D.N.C. 1978) (expressly rejecting the Henry court's restrictive view of the FCRA's
scope).
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privacy, the Henry decision has limited the usefulness of the FCRA in
Minnesota. Although the FCRA may be a step in the right direction, its
infirmities, as it has been interpreted by the Minnesota Federal District
Court, render it incapable of completely protecting the consumer from
credit reporting abuses.
The impact of stare decisis from the Henry decision is quite limited,
however. Either the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals or the United
States Supreme Court could overrule the interpretation of the FCRA
adopted in Henry.9 0 Similarly, a Minnesota state court or the Minnesota Federal District Court could choose to abandon the Henry interpretation and adopt an alternative view of the FCRA. 9 '
D.

Reconciling the Differing Interpretationsof "Consumer
Report "-An Impossibility

As discussed above, the courts have exhibited two quite different
approaches to defining a consumer report. Some courts have looked only
to actual use, thereby narrowing the definition of consumer report.
Under this approach, a consumer report can exist only if the report is
actually used for a designated purpose.' Courts that discuss expected
use find the "actual use" approach taken by the Sizemore court too
restrictive and argue that it is inconsistent with the FCRA's purpose of
protecting the individual's right to privacy and ensuring fair treatment.9 3 After discussing the concept of expected use, these courts hold
190. A United States circuit court of appeals can reverse an interpretation of law that
one of its federal district courts has adopted. See, e.g., Hansen v. Morgan, 582 F.2d 1214
(9th Cir. 1978) (interpretation of FCRA), rev'g 405 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Idaho 1976). Similar
powers of review are possessed by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Nash v.
United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970) (interpretation of Internal Revenue Code), rev'g 414 F.2d
627 (5th Cir. 1969).
191. An interpretation of federal law made by one federal district court is not binding
upon another court within the same district. Compare, e.g., Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp.
919, 931 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
does not preempt California community property law) with, e.g., Francis v. United Technologies Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84, 86 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (ERISA does preempt California
community property law; expressly rejecting analysis of Stone v. Stone).
Similarly, a federal district court's interpretation of federal law is not binding upon a
state suprenie court. State courts are bound only by interpretations of the United States
Supreme Court. See Stevens v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 226 Minn. 148, 151, 32 N.W.2d
312, 314 (1948) ("It is established law that the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court on the construction of a federal statute are binding on state courts."); Edelstein v.
Duluth, M. & I.R. Ry., 225 Minn. 508, 519, 31 N.W.2d 465, 471 (1948) ("In cases involving
rights arising under a federal statute, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States are controlling.").
192. See, e.g., Sizemore v. Bambi Leasing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 252, 254 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
193. See, e.g., Hansen v. Morgan, 582 F.2d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 1978); Rice v. Mont.
gomery Ward & Co., 450 F. Supp. 668, 672 (M.D.N.C. 1978); Belshaw v. Credit Bureau,
392 F. Supp. 1356, 1359 (D. Ariz. 1975).
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that if a reasonable expectation that the information will be used for a
designated purpose exists, the
information will qualify under the defini4
tion as a consumer report.'

Until recently, some courts attempted to reconcile the differing approaches by noting that the FCRA applies only to a transaction in which
a consumer seeks credit or some other benefit." 5 A report issued pursuant to a consumer transaction, they explain, is distinguishable from
a report issued for social service,' identification, 7 or commercial credit
purposes.' While this distinction may have some validity, it cannot
erase the differences between the various courts' approaches. In recent
years, several courts have recognized that the Sizemore and Belshaw
approaches cannot be reconciled.'
Absent resolution of the conflicting interpretations by the United
States Supreme Courtm or clarification by Congress of the meaning of
194. See, e.g., Hansen v. Morgan, 582 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1978). In Hansen, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned as follows:
Since the Pocatello Credit Bureau knew nothing of the Morgans' real reason for
requesting the report, it must have supplied this information with the
expectation that the Morgans would use it for purposes consistent. . . with the
FCRA . . . . And unless the Bureau was generally collecting such information
for purposes not permitted by the FCRA, it must have collected the information
in the report for use consistent with the purposes stated in the act. . . .Accordingly, the credit report . . . was . . . expected to be used . . . for the purpose
of establishing the Hansens' consumer eligibility for credit transactions. As
such it is a consumer report under the FCRA.
Id. at 1218 (emphasis added).
195. See, e.g., Belshaw v. Credit Bureau, 392 F. Supp. 1356, 1359 (D. Ariz. 1975); Rasor
v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wash. 2d 516, 523, 554 P.2d 1041, 1045-46 (1976).
196. See Porter v. Talbot Perkins Children's Servs., 355 F. Supp. 174, 178 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) ("Social service agencies, such as adoption agencies, were not intended to be included in the sweep of the Act.").
197. See Ley v. Boron Oil Co., 419 F. Supp. 1240, 1242-43 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (credit report
used to esablish identity of an attorney is not a consumer report within the FCRA).
198. See, e.g., Wrigley v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 969, 970 (N.D. Ga.)
(commercial credit), affd mem., 500 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1974); Sizemore v. Bambi Leasing
Corp., 360 F. Supp. 252, 254-55 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (business insurance); Fernandez v. Retail
Credit Co., 349 F. Supp. 652, 654 (E.D. La. 1972) (business insurance); Krumholz v. TRW,
Inc., 142 N.J. Super. 80, 84, 360 A.2d 413, 415 (App. Div. 1976) (bank mortgage loan
transaction).
199. See Rice v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 450 F. Supp. 668, 672 (M.D.N.C. 1978)
(criticizing Henry); Henry v. Forbes, 433 F. Supp. 5, 9 (D. Minn. 1976) (criticizing
Belshaw); Gardner v. Investigators, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 780, 781-82 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (criticizing Belshaw).
200. The United States Supreme Court has declined every opportunity to decide an
appeal under the FCRA. See Information Dynamics, Ltd. v. Greenway, 424 U.S. 936
(1976), dismissing cert. to 524 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1975); Retail Credit Corp. v. Hoke, 423
U.S. 1087 (1976), denying cert. to 521 F.2d 1079 (4th Cir. 1975).
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consumer report under the FCRA, 20 1the conflict will continue to affect
consumers. Until the conflict over the definition is resolved, consumer
rights under the FCRA will continue to vary among different jurisdictions. 12 This lack of uniformity among the various federal courts as to
what constitutes a consumer report clouds the scope of the FCRA's
applicability for both the consumer and the reporting agency. While the
consumer cannot determine at what point his personal rights will be
protected, the reporting agency faces the uncertainty of not knowing
when it is engaging in an illegal practice.
V.

A.

STATE REGULATION OF CREDIT REPORTING

The States' Responses to the FCRA -Supplementary Legislation

Although the FCRA represents an improvement over the common law
in its ability to protect consumers, the Act, as applied in Minnesota,
does not adequately protect the individual's rights to privacy and fair
treatment. While the FCRA does supersede common law regulation of
the credit reporting industry,m it does not preempt the entire field of
regulating credit reporting;20 states are free to enact supplemental legislation not inconsistent with the FCRA.205 Taking advantage of this pro201. The FCRA never has been amended by Congress, except for a technical amendment in 1978 to conform the FCRA's restriction on reporting bankruptcy information to
the new federal bankruptcy act. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, §§
601-622, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1976)), as amended
by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. III, § 312, 92 Stat. 2549, 2676,

reprinted in [1978] U.S.

CODE CONG.

& AD.

NEWS.

202. Cf. Rice v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 450 F. Supp. 668, 672 (M.D.N.C. 1978)

("[Ihf this Court were to hold [as did the court in Henry], it would undermine the
consumer's right to privacy, one of the policies underlying the FCRA.").
203. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 610(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (1976). Section
1681h(e) states:
Except as [otherwise provided in the FCRAI, no consumer may bring any
action or proceeding in the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence with respect to the reporting of information, or any person who furnishes
information to a consumer reporting agency, based on information disclosed
pursuant to [the FCRAJ, except as to false information furnished with malice
or willful intent to injure such consumer.
Id.; cf. Ackerley v. Credit Bureau of Sheridan, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 658, 659 (D. Wyo. 1974)
("The Act has codified certain aspects of the common law doctrines of defamation and
imposed certain new requirements.").
204. Section 1681t provides:
This subchapter does not annul, alter, affect or exempt any person . . . from
complying with the laws of any State with respect to the collection, distribution
or use of any information on consumers, except to the extent that those laws
are inconsistent with any provisions of this subchapter, and then only to the
extent of the inconsistency.
Fair Credit Reporting Act § 622, 15 U.S.C. § 1681t (1976).
205. Retail Credit Co. v. Dade County, 393 F. Supp. 577, 580-81 (S.D. Fla. 1975)
("Congress has spoken to allow state regulation consistent with the provisions of the
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vision of the FCRA, several states have enacted laws regulating the
activity of credit reporting.m Some of these statutes offer good examples
for the Minnesota Legislature to follow in its effort to protect private
individuals; in contrast, other state laws also suggest what should not
be done.
A few states have enacted modified definitions of consumer report
that avoid the difficulties encountered in applying the FCRA.20 7 Connecticut's statute applies to "credit reports," defined as any representation made by a "credit rating agency" concerning a consumer's credit 0 8
Other states have elected not to define consumer report,"' apparently
leaving it to judicial decisions. Oklahoma's statute only makes reference
to persons who "furnish . . . [a] financial or credit rating. 210 Similarly, New Mexico's statute, while it defines consumer and credit bu21
reau,2 1 applies to "all information about that particular consumer.
FCRA." (footnote omitted)); see Fair Credit Reporting Act § 622, 15 U.S.C. § 1681t (1976)
(FCRA does not exempt any person from complying with state consumer laws).
206. See ARiz. RED. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1691 to -1696 (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 1785.1-1786.56 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-431 to
-435 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-701 to -722 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 431.350 (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1311-1327 (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); MD.
COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 14-1201 to -1218 (Curi. Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
93, §§ 50-68 (West 1972); MONT.CODE ANN. §§ 31-3-101 to -153 (1978); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 359-B:1 to -C:18 (Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-3-1 to -8 (1978); N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW §§ 380 to 380-s (McKinney Cure. Supp. 1978-1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§§ 81-85 (West 1955); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 9016 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 19781979); cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 17-5(d) (Smith-Hurd 1977) (prohibiting collection
agency from threatening to destroy debtor's credit rating unless disclosure of right to
inspect credit rating made pursuant to federal law); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:1586.1(C)
(West Cure. Supp. 1979) (prohibiting law enforcement agencies from conveying to credit
bureaus, credit rating or credit reporting agencies, photographs or fingerprints that are
part of juvenile arrest records); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25B-2 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (upon request
of a married person, credit reporting agencies must maintain separate credit history of
each spouse).
207. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-431(c) (West Cure. Supp. 1979). Most states,
however, have retained a definition of consumer report that is substantially similar to that
used in the FCRA. Compare Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)
(1976) with Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1691(3) (Cure. Supp. 1978-1979) and CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1785.3(c) (West Curi. Supp. 1979) and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-702(c) (1976) and
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1312(3) (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) and MD. COM. LAW CODE
ANN. § 14-1201(d) (Cum. Supp. 1978) and MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 50 (West 1972)
and MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-3-102(3) (1978) and N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 359-B:3(IV)
(Supp. 1977) and N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 380-a(c) (McKinney Curi. Supp. 1978-1979). A
modified definition could prevent a credit reporting agency from making unauthorized
disclosures. See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 86-87.
208. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-431(c) (West Cure. Supp. 1979).
209. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-3-1 to -8 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 8185 (West 1955); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 9016 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
210. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 81 (West 1955).
211. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-3-1 (1978).
212. Id. § 56-3-2(B).
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Because these statutes do not employ vague and confusing terms such
as expected use or use for permissible purposes, their simple wording
covers a broad spectrum of reports, thereby avoiding the FCRA's definitional problems and offering more consistent protection for consumers.
Commentators have criticized the FCRA for placing no limitation on
the quality or relevancy of the information reported. 1 3 The Maine credit
reporting statute attempts to solve this problem by prohibiting the reporting of irrelevant information.2"' The statute provides no guidance,
however, for determining what is and what is not relevant. Phrasing the
relevancy requirement in such vague terms seems to be an impracticable
approach. By contrast, New York's relevancy requirement is phrased in
more specific language,2 1 5 prohibiting the reporting of information relative to race, religion, color, ancestry, or ethnic origin."' Statutes in
several other states specifically prohibit the reporting of any criminal
arrest or indictment if the individual either was pardoned or not convicted."7 These specific relevancy requirements appear to be more workable than Maine's vague ban on reporting irrelevant information. When
the relevancy requirement designates what information cannot be reported, the statutes can effectively extend protection beyond the
FCRA's singular prohibition against reporting obsolete information.
Another deficiency of the FCRA recognized in many states is the
FCRA's failure to require reporting agencies to disclose more than the
nature and substance of any information on the consumer.' 8 Conse213. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 1, at 633, 641 (statement of John H.F. Shattuck);
Note, Commercial Credit Bureaus: The Right to Privacy and State Action, 24 AM. U.L.
REV. 421, 440-41, 443 (1975); Note, The CaliforniaConsumer Reporting Agencies Act: A
Proposed Improvement on the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1219, 1241,
1247-48 (1975); Comment, A Proposal: A Fair Credit Reporting Act for Missouri, 45 U.
Mo. KAN. CrTy L. REv. 447, 454-56 (1977).
214. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1321(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) ("A consumer
reporting agency shall not prepare, use or report information which it has reason to believe
is inaccurate or not relevant to the purpose for which it is sought.").
215. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 380-j (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
216. See id. § 380-j(a)(2).
217. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1785.13(a)(6), 1786.18(a)(6) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (records of arrest, indictment, conviction older than seven years, pardon, or non-conviction
cannot be reported); Ky. REv. STAT. § 431.350 (1975) (may not report criminal charge
unless conviction resulted); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-3-6(A)(5) (1978) (reporting no longer
permitted if pardoned or not convicted after arrest); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 380-j(a)(1)
(McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (arrest or criminal charge cannot be reported unless
conviction resulted).
218. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 609(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a) (1976) ("Every
consumer reporting agency shall . . . clearly and accurately disclose . . . [tJhe nature
and substance of all information . . . in its files on the consumer at the time of the
request."). This FCRA requirement has been the subject of some controversy. See note
261 infra and accompanying text. The Privacy Protection Study Commission has recommended that the FCRA be amended to permit consumers to visually inspect any informa-
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quently, many states require reporting agencies to disclose the actual
contents of the consumer's file when the consumer so requests. 2 1 Oklahoma has gone even further, requiring a consumer reporting agency to
send the consumer an advance copy of any report before it is sent to the
user.2" In New York, reporting agencies must give the consumer advance
notice that a report will be issued,2' Although the two states' statutes
accomplish the same result of informing the consumer that his background is being investigated, the difference in methods gives the New
York consumer less advance information. In Oklahoma, the consumer
actually sees the report before it is sent to the user, 22 whereas the New
York consumer only receives notice of the report and must take further
action to ascertain its contents.2n
Having recognized problems in the FCRA, many states have enacted
their own solutions. By carefully drafting their statutes to effectively
avoid or circumvent the definitional problems of the FCRA, these states
have apparently succeeded in extending consumer protection beyond
federal law.
B.

Constitutional Considerations

Although states are permitted to enact additional legislation, such
legislation cannot be inconsistent with the FCRA. 22 ' This limitation
places constitutional restrictions on the regulation of credit reporting
by the states?2 Therefore, any statutes enacted in the future must be
carefully drafted to avoid the potential problem of inconsistency with
the FCRA.
tion held by a credit bureau. See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at
80-81.
219. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1693(A)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); CAL. Civ. CODE
§§ 1785.10, 1786.10 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1315(1) (Cum.
Supp. 1978-1979) (all information except medical information and source of records); MD.
COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 14-1206(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93, §
56(1) (West 1972) ("nature, contents and substance of all information except medical
information"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-3-2(B) (1978) (credit bureau shall disclose content
of all information); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 380-d(a)(1) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
220. See Polin v. Retail Credit Co., 469 P.2d 1004, 1005 (Okla. 1970) (dictum) (statute
requires that customers be mailed a copy of all written opinions to be submitted to any
retail business concern); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 82 (West 1955).
221. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 380-b(b) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
222. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 82 (West 1955) ("Whenever an opinion . . . upon
the financial or credit standing of any person is about to be submitted . . . the person,
firm or corporation submitting such opinion shall first mail a copy of such opinion to the
person about whom the opinion is given.").
223. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 380-b(b) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
224. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 622, 15 U.S.C. § 1681t (1976).
225. See Retail Credit Co. v. Dade County, 393 F. Supp. 577, 579-81 (S.D. Fla. 1975)
(ordinance invalid under supremacy clause because inconsistent with the FCRA).
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In 1974, Dade County, Florida enacted several ordinances intended to
supplement and strengthen the FCRA.1 ' These ordinances required a
consumer reporting agency, upon the consumer's request, to disclose
actual copies of the consumer's file, to disclose all medical information
on the consumer that it might hold, and to disclose the names and
sources of all information used in investigative consumer reports.127 Furthermore, the ordinances removed the reporting agency's immunity
from common law tort liability, forbade any investigator of an agency
from visiting private residences to obtain information, and placed upon
the reporting agency the burden of proving, in the event of a criminal
prosecution under the ordinance, that the agency used reasonable proce2
dures to ensure accuracy of reported information. 2
When a credit reporting agency opposed these ordinances and brought
an action to enjoin their enforcement, all but one of the ordinances were
found to be unconstitutional.2n In Retail Credit Co. v. Dade County,2N
a Florida Federal District Court held that requiring the disclosure of
medical information and names of sources of information for investigative reports was inconsistent with the FCRA. 231 The FCRA exempts
these types of information from its disclosure requirements, effectively
giving credit reporting agencies a privilege to conceal such information. 2 The Dade County court determined that a local law could not
alter a privilege granted by a congressional act.? Similarly, the ordinance that removed agency immunity from common law tort liability
also was held to be inconsistent with the FCRA.2" Because of inconsistencies with the FCRA, the ordinances were unconstitutional under the
supremacy clause m
Two additional ordinances were invalidated on other constitutional
grounds. First, placing the burden of proof in a criminal prosecution
upon reporting agencies to show that they maintained reasonable procedures was held to violate the requirements of due process? 63 Second, the
ordinance prohibiting investigators from visiting private residences was
found both to violate due process and to place an undue burden on
226. See id. at 579 & n.1, 584 n.11, 585 n.15, 586 nn.16 & 17.
227. See id. at 581-85.
228. See id. at 583-84, 585 & n.15, 586 & n.16.
229. See id. at 579, 589-90.
230. 393 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
231. See id. at 582-83.
232. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 609(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1) (1976) (exempting medical information from disclosure requirement); id. § 609(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §
1681g(a)(2) (exempting sources of information acquired solely for use in preparing investigative consumer reports from disclosure requirement).
233. See 393 F. Supp. at 581-83.
234. See id. at 583-84.
235. See id. at 581 n.6.
236. See id. at 586, 589.
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commerce.2 37 The remaining ordinance, which required credit reporting
agencies to disclose the actual contents of any file to the consumer, was
upheld.13 The ordinance was not inconsistent with the FCRA, and did
not violate either the commerce clause or the due process clause of the
United States Constitution.131
The primary teaching of Dade County is that state credit reporting
laws cannot abridge rights that the FCRA specifically grants to consumer reporting agencies.4 0 Such legislation violates the FCRA's prohibition against inconsistent state laws.24' As the Dade County court
noted, however, states are still free to enact regulations stricter than
those provided in the FCRA.2 " Therefore, although the Minnesota Legislature should take steps to give better protection to Minnesota consumers, it must draft legislation that avoids the constitutional faults
that invalidated the ordinances in Dade County.
C.

The Minnesota Data Privacy Act

To date, Minnesota has not enacted laws to regulate the credit reporting industry, 4 ' although the Legislature has taken other significant
steps in the realm of consumer protection. 24 For example, the Legislature already has recognized individual privacy as an interest deserving
protection. 45 As a result, the Minnesota Data Privacy Act (MDPA) was
enacted.2
Because the MDPA shares some similarities with the
237. See id. at 587-89.
238. See id. at 584-85.
239. See id. at 585.
240. See id. at 581 (state credit reporting laws may not frustrate the effectiveness or
purpose of the FCRA).
241. See id. at 580 & n.5; Fair Credit Reporting Act § 622, 15 U.S.C. § 1681t (1976).
242. See 393 F. Supp. at 580.
243. One proposed reform was introduced during the Minnesota legislative session of
1977. See H.F. 1645, 70th Minn. Legis., 1977 Sess. (requiring credit bureaus to notify
consumers when a credit rating file has been established or changed). The bill died after
reference to the House Committee on Commerce and Economic Development. See 2 MINN.
H.R. JOUR. 2868 (1977).
244. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 325.93-.9325 (1978) (regulating credit cards and credit
card billing disputes); id. §§ 325.933-.938 (regulating home solicitation sales); id. §§
325.94-.947 (regulating consumer credit sales); id. §§ 325.951-.954 (providing special warranties for sales to consumers).
245. See id. §§ 15.162-169, as amended by Act of June 5, 1979, ch. 328, 1979 Minn.
Sess. Law Serv. 914 (West); Note, supra note 22, at 166 & nn.15 & 16.
246. Minnesota Data Privacy Act, ch. 479, 1974 Minn. Laws 1199, as amended by Act
of June 2, 1975, ch. 271, §§ 3(13), 6, 1975 Minn. Laws 742, 744, 747, as amended by Act
of June 5, 1975, ch. 401, 1975 Minn. Laws 1353, as amended by Act of Apr. 9, 1976, ch.
239, §§ 2-6, 1976 Minn. Laws 880, 880-81, as amended by Act of Apr. 13, 1976, ch. 283,
1976 Minn. Laws 1063, as amended by Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 375, 1977 Minn. Laws 825,
as amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 790, 1978 Minn. Laws 1155 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§§ 15.162-.169 (1978), as amended by Act of June 5, 1979, ch. 328, 1979 Minn. Sess. Law
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FCRA,47 the MDPA can serve as an excellent model for improving the
regulation of credit reporting in Minnesota.
The MDPA regulates the dissemination of information by state government agencies and defines the rights of citizens who are subjects of
the data.248 Basically, the MDPA provides that any private or confidential information stored or collected by a state agency cannot be released
except according to law or with the subject individual's consent. '4" An
individual has the right to see any public or private, but not confidential, data concerning him that the state has collected 5 0- and to dispute
its accuracy.2 ' 1 If the consumer disputes the information, the state
agency must either correct the inaccuracy or record the individual's
statement of disagreement.2 52 This statement then must be disclosed
simultaneously with any data.23 These MDPA procedural and regulatory provisions closely resemble those of the FCRA.54
Like the MDPA, the FCRA also regulates state agencies, 5' including
Serv. 914 (West)); see Mitau, Toward a Comprehensive FairInformation StandardsLaw:
A Commentary on the Data Privacy Issue in Minnesota, 62 MINN. L. REv. 649, 659-60
(1978).
247. Compare MINN. STAT. §§ 15.162-.169 (1978), as amended by Act of June 5, 1979,
ch. 328, 1979 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 914 (West) with Fair Credit Reporting Act §§ 601622, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1976), as amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-598, tit. I1, § 312, 92 Stat. 2549, 2676, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS.
248. See MINN. STAT. §§ 15.163-.165, .1671 (1978), as amended by Act of June 5, 1979,
ch. 328, §§ 8-13, 24, 1979 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 914, 916-19, 923 (West); Mitau, supra
note 246, at 659-62.
249. See MINN. STAT. § 15.165 (1978).
250. See id. § 15.165(3). Private, public, and confidential data are Minnesota Data
Privacy Act terms of art. See id. § 15.162(2a), (5a)-(5b), as amended by Act of June 5,
1979, ch. 328, § 3, 1979 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 914, 914 (West).
251. See MINN. STAT. § 15.165(4) (1978).
252. See id.
253. Id.
254. Compare id. §§ 15.162-.169, as amended by Act of June 5, 1979, ch. 328, 1979
Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 914 (West) with Fair Credit Reporting Act §§ 601-622, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1681-1681t (1976), as amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
tit. 1H, § 312, 92 Stat. 2549, 2676, reprinted in [1978J U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws.
255. Compare Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(b) (1976)
("person" defined to include any "government or governmental subdivision or agency")
and id. § 603(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (" 'consumer reporting agency' means any person
which . . .regularly engages . . .in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer
credit information . . . for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports") and id. §
604(3)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3)(D) ("determination of the consumer's eligibility for a
license or other benefit granted by a governmental instrumentality" is a permissible
purpose for furnishing a consumer report) with MINN. STAT. § 15.162(6) (1978), as
amended by Act of June 5, 1979, ch. 328, § 4, 1979 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 914, 914 (West)
(defining "responsible authority" in a state agency as "the state official designated by
law" and in a political subdivision as "the individual designated by the governing body
of that political subdivision") and MINN. STAT. § 15.165 (1978) (establishing responsible
authority's obligation to individual citizens under the Minnesota Data Privacy Act).
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them within the definition of a consumer reporting agency." 6 A comparative analysis of these two statutes reveals some major differences, however. The most obvious difference is that the MDPA applies only to state
government, while the FCRA applies to the private as well as the public
sector.27 The MDPA is broader in that it regulates the dissemination of
all data held by state agencies, not merely that used for a few specified
purposes.25 In regulating all such data, the MDPA avoids definitional
problems of the type that plague the FCRA; the MDPA leaves no room
and no need for conjecture about how the information was used or expected to be used. If a state agency holds the information, the private
individual is protected. 9 While the MDPA requires disclosure of the
actual contents of any state-held file or record upon the citizen's request, the FCRA's disclosure requirement only permits the consumer to
see the nature and substance of the information held by a consumer
reporting agency.6 0 Because the FCRA permits reporting agencies to
avoid full disclosure by being less than candid with consumers, some
commentators have criticized the FCRA's limited disclosure requirement. 2 ' To whatever extent this is a problem in the FCRA, it is avoided
62
by the MDPA.1
256. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(b) (1976) ("person"
defined to include "government or governmental subdivision or agency"); id. § 603(t), 15
U.S.C. § 1681a(f) ("consumer reporting agency" defined, in part, as "any person").
257. Compare MINN. STAT. §§ 15.162-.169 (1978), as amended by Act of June 5, 1979,
ch. 328, 1979 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 914 (West) with Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603(b),
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(b) (1976) ("The term 'person' means any individual, partnership,
corporation, trust, estate, cooperative, association, government or governmental subdivision or agency, or other entity.") and id. § 603(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (defining consumer
reporting agency as "any person which . . . regularly engages . . . in the practice of
assembling or evaluating consumer credit information . . . for the purpose of furnishing
consumer reports").
258. See MINN. STAT. § 15.162(3) (1978) (" 'Data on individuals' includes all records,
files and processes in which an individual is or can be identified ....
").
259. See id. §§ 15.165-.166, as amended by Act of June 5, 1979, ch. 328, § 14, 1979 Minn.
Sess. Law Serv. 914, 919 (West).
260. Compare MINN. STAT. § 15.165(3) (1978) ("[Aln individual who is the subject of
stored private data on individuals shall be shown the data [and] shall be informed of
the content and meaning of that data ....
") with Fair Credit Reporting Act § 609(a)(1),
15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1) (1976) (upon request, every consumer reporting agency shall
disclose "[tihe nature and substance of all information . . . in its files on the consumer").
261. See, e.g., 1973 Hearings, supra note 1, at 646 (statement of Lewis A. Engman);
PRIVACY PROTECION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 68, 77; Feldman, The FairCredit
Reporting Act-From the Regulators Vantage Point, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 459, 474-76
(1974); Note, Commercial Credit Bureaus: The Right to Privacy and State Action, 24 Am.
U.L. REV. 421, 440-43 (1975).
262. But see Mitau, supra note 246, at 662 ("The Minnesota Data Privacy Act, while
commendable as an initial effort, simply does not go far enough to protect emerging
expectations of informational privacy.").
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The MDPA's protection of personal privacy offers a good example for
the Minnesota Legislature to follow in enacting an improved credit reporting statute. Through such an effort, the restrictive holding of Henry
v. Forbes and other FCRA problems can be effectively avoided and the
Minnesota consumer's rights to privacy and fair treatment better protected.
VI.

CONCLUSION

When the common law proved to be of little help in protecting the
consumer's interest in fair treatment and privacy, Congress responded
by adopting the FCRA. Although Congress intended to improve the
protection of individual privacy and fair treatment, that goal has been
frustrated by inconsistent applications of the FCRA by the courts. 6 3 As
a consequence of the ambiguous definition and the resulting inconsistent applications of the Act, the FCRA better protects personal privacy
in some jurisdictions than in others.2 '
In the scenario at the beginning of this Note, John Smith never
learned why he was not promoted. If he had discovered the source of his
problem and sought relief under the FCRA, his chance of success would
depend, to a great extent, on where his federally-created cause of action
was litigated. The court's initial inquiry would be whether the information disseminated by the credit bureau would qualify as a consumer
report. If the information was assembled initially for purposes of consumer credit, or if the information was expected to be used for a purpose
designated by the FCRA, then, in some jurisdictions, the information
would qualify as a consumer report. 65 On the other hand, because the
insurance policy on Mr. Smith's life was being sought for a corporate
business purpose, some jurisdictions would find that the information did
not constitute a consumer report. 6 Whether or not Mr. Smith would
receive the benefit of the FCRA's regulations and remedies depends on
a court's classification of the information. If it would not qualify as a
consumer report, the FCRA would not apply, and Mr. Smith would be
left with little more than a common law action for defamation to protect
his interests.267
Would Mr. Smith have adequate protection in Minnesota? Quite
probably, he would not. With state statutory law on credit reporting still
nonexistent in Minnesota, Mr. Smith would have only a common law
defamation action or an action under the FCRA. 218 The effectiveness of
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

See
See
See
See
See
See

notes 104-202 supra and accompanying text.
note 202 supra and accompanying text.
notes 120-37 supra and accompanying text.
notes 110-19 supra and accompanying text.
notes 106-09 supra and accompanying text.
notes 16-103 supra and accompanying text.
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the FCRA, however, has been seriously curtailed by the restrictive holding of Henry v. Forbes."'Because of Henry, Minnesota consumers do
not enjoy the protection of personal privacy and fair treatment that the
FCRA should afford.2 0 Although the FCRA may be a significant step
toward improved protection of personal privacy, its shortcomings, as it
has been interpreted by the Minnesota Federal District Court, have
rendered the Act incapable of achieving its original purpose.
The Minnesota Legislature, using the statutes of other states as models, should enact supplementary credit reporting laws to overcome the
limitation on the FCRA's protection of personal privacy. A concern for
individual privacy already has been expressed in the MDPA and should
provide the impetus for supplementation of the FCRA. Within the supplementary legislation, clarification of the term consumer report could
be achieved by a specific statement that the statute applies to all distributions of information on a private individual by a credit bureau. The
Legislature also should consider restricting the types of information that
can be reported, excluding such information as the individual's race and
religion and other similar information, which would have no bearing on
insurability, credit worthiness, or employment qualifications. Finally,
to improve on the FCRA's disclosure requirements, the legislation
should require consumer reporting agencies to disclose the actual contents of its files to the subject consumer, with exceptions for medical and
other information for which mandatory disclosure would cause constitutional problems. This additional disclosure requirement would enable
the consumer to ensure accuracy and completeness of the information.
As society becomes more complex, the need, or at least the demand,
for credit information increases?' At the same time, individuals express
a mounting concern that they are losing the few remaining vestiges of
their personal privacy. In drafting supplemetary legislation, the Minnesota Legislature should balance the interests of the users of credit information and the consumer. By clarifying the rights and obligations of
both consumers and credit reporting agencies, the Legislature can cure
the deficiencies of the existing law and improve the quality of protection
from credit reporting abuse. The Legislature can, by broadening the
applicability of credit reporting laws, extend its policy of protecting
personal privacy to every John Smith.
269. 433 F. Supp. 5 (D. Minn. 1976). For an examination of Henry, see notes 172-91
supra and accompanying text.
270. See notes 185-91 supra and accompanying text.
271. Cf. 116 CONG. Rac. 35941 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire) ("In view of the
growing importance of credit information in our economy, we must give consumers a
higher degree of protection against the consequences of an inaccurate or misleading credit
report.").
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APPENDIX: A PROPOSED CREDIT REPORTING ACT FOR
MINNESOTA
Section 1. DEFINITIONS. For the purposes of this Act:
(a) The term "consumer" means an individual;
(b) The term "credit bureau" means any person or organization
engaging in the practice of assembling or reporting information on consumers that relates to credit, reputation, personal characteristics, or
mode of living, collected for the purpose of furnishing such information
to third parties.'
Section 2. PURPOSES FOR WHICH CREDIT BUREAUS MAY
FURNISH INFORMATION ON CONSUMERS. A credit bureau may
furnish information on consumers under the following circumstances
and no other:
(a) In response to the order of a court having jurisdiction to issue
such an order.
(b) In accordance with the written instructions of the consumer to
whom it relates.
(c) To a person which it has reason to believe(1) intends to use the information in connection with a
credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and involving the extension of
credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the consumer; or
(2) intends to use the information for employment purposes; or
(3) intends to use the information in connection with the
underwriting of insurance involving the consumer; or
1. The definition of "consumer" is borrowed from the FCRA. See Fair Credit Reporting
Act § 603(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c) (1976). "Credit bureau" comes in part from TEx. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 9016(1) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979), and in part from Fair Credit
Reporting Act § 603(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1976) (defining consumer report), but
"credit bureau" does not vary in any material way from the FCRA's definition of
"consumer reporting agency." Compare Proposed Act § l(b) with Fair Credit Reporting
Act § 603(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (1976).
A definition of "consumer report" or some similar term is omitted intentionally from
the Proposed Act. This definition has caused the greatest problem in applying the Fair
Credit Reporting Act and, in some cases, has narrowed the Act's scope of consumer
protection. See notes 43-67 supra and accompanying text. There appears to be no good
reason why this definition is necessary, so the Proposed Act covers all information reported
by credit bureaus that relates to consumers. Following the lead of other states, it would
appear wise to exclude this definition. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-3-1 to -8 (1978);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 81-85 (West 1955); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 9016
(Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
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(4) intends to use the information in connection with a
determination of the consumer's eligibility for a license or
other benefit granted by a governmental instrumentality required by law to consider an applicant's financial responsibility or status; or
(5) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information in connection with a business transaction involving
the consumer.'
Section 3. PROHIBITED INFORMATION. No credit bureau shall
report or maintain in its file on a consumer, information:
(a) relative to a consumer's race, religion, color, ancestry, or ethnic
origin, or;
(b) relative to an arrest or a criminal charge unless(1) such charges are still pending; or
(2) there has been a criminal conviction for such offense,
3
and there has been no pardon for such offense.
Section 4. COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES. Every credit bureau
shall maintain reasonable procedures designed to avoid violations of this
Act and to limit the furnishing of information on consumers to the
purposes listed under section 2 of this Act. These procedures shall require that prospective users of the information identify themselves, certify the purposes for which the information is sought, and certify that
the information will be used for no other purpose. Every credit bureau
2. Section 2 of the Proposed Act is an almost verbatim copy of the FCRA's list of
permissible purposes for consumer reports. The only changes are that "credit bureau" has
been substituted for the FCRA term "consumer reporting agency," and "information on
consumers" has replaced "consumer report." Compare Proposed Act § 2 with Fair Credit
Reporting Act § 604, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1976).
3. The FCRA already prohibits the reporting of certain types of obsolete information-basically adverse information more than seven years old. See Fair Credit Reporting
Act § 605, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (1976) (bankruptcies, outstanding judgments, paid tax liens,
overdue accounts, arrest records, other adverse information), as amended by Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. m, § 312, 92 Stat. 2549, 2676, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS. The Proposed Act's ban on reporting race, religion,
color, ancestry and ethnic origin is a new provision borrowed from N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §
380-j(a)(2) (McKinney Curi. Supp. 1978-1979).
Reports of arrests, indictments, or convictions are prohibited by the FCRA when the
report antedates release, parole, or disposition of the criminal action by more than seven
years. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 605(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(5) (1976). No
provision is made by the FCRA for criminal charges that did not result in conviction, or
for which an individual has been pardoned. Proposed Act § 3(b) is recommended as a
provision covering this matter. It is taken essentially from similar provisions of several
states. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1785.13(a)(6), 1786.18(a)(6) (West Cum. Supp. 1979); Ky.
REv. STAT. § 431.350 (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-3-6(A)(5) (1978); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 380-j(a)(1) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
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shall make a reasonable effort to verify the identity of a new prospective
user and the uses certified by such prospective user prior to furnishing
such user any information relating to a consumer. No credit bureau may
furnish information relating to a consumer to any person if the credit
bureau has reasonable grounds for believing that the information will
not be used for a purpose listed in section 2 of this Act. Whenever a
credit bureau prepares information on a consumer, it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the consumer about whom the information relates.'
Section 5. DISCLOSURE. Subdivision 1. Except as otherwise provided by law, upon the consumer's request a credit bureau shall permit
the consumer to read an accurate copy of all information about that
particular consumer that it maintains in its records, provided the consumer making the request presents adequate identification.
Subd. 2. Whenever a consumer requests disclosure pursuant to this
section, the consumer shall be informed by the credit bureau of the
consumer's right to dispute the accuracy of any information that is
disclosed. In case of dispute, the credit bureau shall either delete the
disputed information from its records, or verify its accuracy. If the consumer continues to dispute the information after its accuracy has been
verified by the credit bureau, the credit bureau shall inform the consumer of the consumer's right to file a brief statement setting forth the
nature of the dispute.
Subd. 3. Whenever a statement of a dispute is filed, unless there are
reasonable grounds to believe that it is frivolous or irrelevant, the credit
bureau shall, in any subsequent report of the information in question,
clearly note that it is disputed by the consumer and provide either the
consumer's statement or a clear and accurate summary thereof. 5
4. Proposed Act § 4 is taken directly from Fair Credit Reporting Act § 607, 15 U.S.C. §
1681e (1976). Only technical alterations have been made to conform it to the Proposed
Act. Its purpose is to ensure that credit bureaus have the same obligations under the
Proposed Act as they do presently under the FCRA, the only difference being that the
Proposed Act would have wider application because it avoids the use of a confusing
definition of consumer report.
5. This disclosure provision is broader than that contained in the FCRA. First, it requires disclosure of the actual contents of information relating to the consumer, not merely
the nature and substance of the information that the FCRA requires to be disclosed. See
Fair Credit Reporting Act § 609, 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (1976). Disclosure of the actual
contents of a consumer's file apparently is something that credit bureaus already do on
some occasions. See, e.g., Henry v. Forbes, 433 F. Supp. 5, 7 (D. Minn. 1976) ("She. ..
visited the local Retail Credit office and had the report read to her."). This practice is
not universal however. See, e.g., Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wash. 2d 516, 519, 554
P.2d 1041, 1044 (1976) ("She was not allowed to read the report but was informed of its
contents ....").The purpose for such a provision in the Proposed Act is to prevent less
than full disclosure by a credit bureau. See generally Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc.,
383 F. Supp. 269, 275 (E.D. Mo. 1974) ("[The defendant violated] § 1681g(a)(1) in that

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1979

41

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 2
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

Section 6. REQUIREMENTS ON USERS OF INFORMATION.
Subdivision 1. No person shall obtain information from a credit bureau
under false pretenses.
Subd. 2. No person shall use information obtained from a credit
bureau for any purpose other than those designated in section 2 of this
Act.'
it failed to disclose ...
the nature and substance of all the information contained in its
files concerning Millstone. To say that O'Hanlon was parsimonious in its disclosure in this
case would be an exercise in understatement."), aff'd, 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976).
Disclosure of the actual contents of a consumer's file is already in force in many other
states. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1693(A)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1785.10, 1786.10 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1315(1) (Cum.
Supp. 1978-1979); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 14-1206(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 56(1) (West 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-3-2(B) (1978); N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW § 380-d(a)(1) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); cf. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 82 (West 1955) (consumer must be sent advance copy of report before it is sent to user).
Proposed Act § 5 begins with the statement "[elxcept as otherwise provided by law."
This is designed to prevent the Proposed Act from being construed to require the disclosure of medical information. Medical information receives a special exemption from the
FCRA's disclosure requirement. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 609(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §
1681g(a)(1) (1976). Any attempt to override this FCRA privilege may result in the invalidation of the Proposed Act's disclosure requirement. Cf. Retail Credit Co. v. Dade County,
393 F. Supp. 577, 582-83 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (invalidating county ordinance requiring disclosure of medical information because such disclosure would be inconsistent with the
FCRA).
Subdivision 2 of Proposed Act § 5 requires credit bureaus to advise consumers of their
right to dispute the accuracy of information contained in a credit bureau's records. This
right has been given to consumers by the FCRA. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 611(a),
15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a) (1976). Presently, nobody is required to advise the consumer that this
right exists. The purpose for adding this requirement is to make it easier for the consumer
to employ the FCRA's self-help remedies.
Subdivision 2 further requires credit bureaus to advise consumers of their right to file a
brief statement setting forth the nature of the dispute when the accuracy of information
in the credit bureau's records cannot be resolved. This right is given to consumers by Fair
Credit Reporting Act § 611(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(b) (1976). The reason for adding this
provision, which requires credit bureaus to advise consumers of this right, is also to aid
the consumer in using the self-help remedies given by the FCRA. New York already has
a similar provision in its credit reporting law. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 380f(a)(McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
Subdivision 3 is taken from Fair Credit Reporting Act § 611(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(c)
(1976). It is included in the Proposed Act to clarify that the remedy is available to the
consumer under the new law.
6. Subdivision 1 of Proposed Act § 6, when read in conjunction with Proposed Act § 7,
imposes civil liability upon any person who obtains information from a credit bureau
under false pretenses. The FCRA already prohibits this activity, and provides for criminal
penalties in case of a violation. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 619, 15 U.S.C. § 1681q
(1976). Some courts have construed the FCRA as also providing for civil liability against
a user who violates this provision. See, e.g., Hansen v. Morgan, 582 F.2d 1214, 1219 (9th
Cir. 1978); Rice v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 450 F. Supp. 668, 671 (M.D.N.C. 1978). The
purpose for including this requirement in the Proposed Act is to make it clear that civil
liability will attach to such a violation.
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Section 7. CIVIL LIABILITY. Any credit bureau or user of information that fails to comply with any requirement imposed by this Act with
respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer for the sum of(a) any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the
failure to comply; and
(b) in the case of any successful action to enforce any liability under
this Act, the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney's fees
as determined by the court.
In the event that a credit bureau or user of information willfully fails
to comply with any requirement imposed by this Act, the consumer
shall also be entitled to recover punitive damages of not less than one
hundred dollars or more than five thousand dollars for each violation as
the court deems proper.'
Section 8. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. In addition to any other remedy
contained in this Act, injunctive relief shall be available to any applicant aggrieved by a violation or threatened violation of this Act.8
Subdivision 2 tightens the requirements presently imposed by the FCRA, and is the
second most significant difference between the Proposed Act and the FCRA, next to the
abolition of the definition of consumer report. Under present law, consumer reporting
agencies may furnish consumer reports only for certain permissible purposes. See Fair
Credit Reporting Act § 604, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1976). Users of reports must certify the
purpose for which the information is sought, see id. § 607(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a), and
risk legal sanctions if they obtain a report under false pretenses, see id. § 619, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681q. The definition of consumer report, however, provides the FCRA's major loophole.
Because consumer report is defined, in part, as a report used for a permissible purpose, a
report used for some other purpose might not be a consumer report. See notes 106-19 supra
and accompanying text. According to some courts, the FCRA does not apply in these
circumstances because of the absence of a consumer report. See, e.g., Henry v. Forbes,
433 F. Supp. 5, 9-10 (D. Minn. 1976). Subdivision 2 of Proposed Act § 6, coupled with
the Proposed Act's intentional omission of the definition of consumer report, is designed
to close this loophole. It clarifies the position that users may not obtain any information
on consumers, except when they actually use the information for the permissible purposes.
7. Proposed Act § 7, providing civil liability for negligent failure to comply with the Act,
adopts the same remedies as are presently available under the FCRA for negligent noncompliance. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 617, 15 U.S.C. § 16810 (1976). The remedies
for willful noncompliance are also the same, compare id. § 616, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n with
Proposed Act § 7, except that the Proposed Act includes minimum and maximum ceiling
amounts on punitive damages. California has such a provision in its credit reporting law.
See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1785.31(a)(2)(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). The reason for minimum
and maximum ceiling amounts on punitive damages is to avoid excessive punitive damage
awards, while at the same time making it worthwhile for the consumer to pursue his
remedy in the event of a willful violation. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A) (1976) (liability
to individuals for Truth in Lending violations shall not be less than $100 nor greater than
$1000).
8. The equitable remedy of injunctive relief is inserted in the Proposed Act so that
violations can be prevented. California also has such a provision. See CAL. Cv. CODE §
1785.31(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
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Section 9. SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held to be invalid, such
invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this Act,
which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application,
and to this end the provisions of this Act are severable.'
Section 10. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. An action to enforce any
liability created under this Act may be brought in any appropriate court
of competent jurisdiction within two years from the date on which the
liability arises except that if a defendant has materially and willfully
misrepresented any information required under this Act to be disclosed
to a consumer, the action may be brought at any time within two years
after the discovery by the consumer of the misrepresentation."1
9. The severability provision is included in the Proposed Act for the obvious reason of
attempting to avoid invalidation of the entire act in the event that one provision is held
to be unconstitutional. Section 9 is copied from New York's law. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 380-s (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
10. The statute of limitations is taken in material form from Fair Credit Reporting Act
§ 618, 15 U.S.C. § 16 81p (1976),
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